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Résumé de synthèse 
v 
À travers les romans de Thomas Carlyle, Lewis Carroll et George Eliot et en 
utilisant les théories de Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel et Judith Butler, ce 
mémoire considère la manière dont les changements dans diverses arènes 
d'importances pour les victoriens - politiques, industrielles et sociales - ouvrirent 
une fissure entre une tradition religieuse et un mysticisme spirituel, un 
comportement normatif dicté par une dimension sociale et un style de vie, les 
rôles traditionnels masculin et féminin et un débat renouvelé sur la position des 
femmes dans la société. Faisant attention particulièrement à la construction 
normative, désir et reconnaissance, ce mémoire explore l'espace fructueux qui 
existe entre le status quo et le futur qui avance rapidement, les efforts pour 
comprendre comment cet espace est produit et se comporte dans la littérature 
victorienne. 
Mots clefs: littérature victorienne, fissure, espace, perfomative, reconnaissance, 
attente, Hegel, Butler. 
Abstract 
'. 
Vil 
Through the novels of Thomas Carlyle, Lewis Carroll and George Eliot and 
employing the theories of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Judith Butler as a 
template, this thesis considers the manner in which changes in various arenas of 
particular import to Victorians - political, industrial, social - opened gaps 
between religious tradition and spiritual mysticism, socially dictated nonnative 
behavior and actuallifestyIe, traditional gender roI es and a much debated more 
. powerful position for women. With particular attention to performative 
construction, recognition and desire, this exploration of the fertile space between 
the status quo and the rapidIy advancing future, attempts to understand how space 
is produced and functions within the literature of the Victorian era. 
Key Words: Victorian, gap, space, perfonnative, recognition, expectation, Hegel, 
Butler. 
VIII 
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction: Tightrope Over the Gulf. ................. ........... .... ....... ..... 1 
2. Chapter 1: Tailoring the Margins: Performative Utterance and the 
Performative in Thomas Carlyle's Sartor Resartus ..... .. .... . ......... ... ... ..... 7 
3. Chapter 2: Between the ''l''s: Shifting Identity and Hegel's Theory of 
Recognition in Lewis Carroll's Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. ........... 30 
4. Chapter 3: Who Goes There: Hegelian Recognition in Middlemarch ....... 53 
5. Conclusion ......................................................... .... .. .. . . .... ...... 80 
6. Works Cited .............................................. ........... . ......... .. ...... 85 
IX 
Acknowledgements 
1 would like to thank my husband Sheldon Schafer and my daughters Abigail and 
Audrey Schafer for their unending patience and support, my friends for their 
unwavering interest despite my preoccupation with technicalities, and my 
supervisor Prof essor Eberlé-Sinatra for bis sense of priorities. 
Introduction 
Tightrope Over the Gulf 
In 1869 John Stuart Mill wrote the essay "The Subjection ofWomen" in 
which he inc1uded the following description of the formation ofrules, laws and social 
policy: 
Laws and systems of polit y always begin by recognizing the relations 
they find already existing between individuals. They convert what 
was a mere physical fact into a legal right, give it the sanction of 
society, and principally aim at the substitution of public and organized 
means of asserting and protecting these rights, instead of the irregular 
and lawless conflict of physical strength. Those who had already been 
compelled to obedience became in this manner legally bound to it. 
(Mill 315) 
It is a compelling description of a power structure that lies at the root of any number 
of systems of government and social regimes even today, a methodology by which to 
create a legal status for a desired system of associations, thus cementing a set of 
preferred identities and their surrounding structure of relationships. At my first 
reading of the se words 1 was struck by the c1arity with which this statement delineates 
the roots of what is often touted as inalienable and represented as a sacred trust 
regardless of any possibly shady and less than egalitarian origins. However, with that 
said, what Mill fails to note (likely because it does not serve the purposes ofhis 
attempt) is the very aspect ofthose laws that he is in the midst of employing - the 
space that exists between the rule and those ruled particularly noticeable when the fit 
between the two is not tenable and therefore necessitates change or forced acceptance 
- a space in which changes to customs, ideas and edicts might become nascent. 
2 
It is that space or gap that is of interest to me in this work, for the Victorian era, 
that period that lasted ostensibly (although the first work 1 will be dealing with 
slightly predates this timeframe) from Victoria's ascent to the throne in 1837 to her 
death in 1901, was an era epitomized by "a sudden nationwide disposition toward 
change" (Mermin & Tucker 3); that change required room in which to occur. 
Through a consideration of the work ofthree influential Victorian writers, Thomas 
Carlyle, Lewis Carroll and George Eliot, and employing a template composed of 
theories primarily from the work of Georg Wilhelm Freidrich Hegel and Judith 
Butler, 1 will be investigating both the occurrence and the effect of the gaps within 
their texts (and in sorne cases their lives) in order to understand sorne of the ways in 
which the dazzling numbers of radical changes of the Victorian era were powered and 
implemented. For this first incarnation of a truly global society produced a need to 
understand a world far more complex then had been previously necessary. This was a 
world that encompassed a broad spectrum of societies and customs with an equally 
broad spectrum of questions in need of "solutions" or at least sorne method with 
which to address them; this need to adjust placed a figurative hand firmly in the back 
of the govemment, certainly, but it is observable as weIl in the work ofmany of the 
era's major thinkers and writers from the very first text categorized as "Victorian." 
As Thomas Carlyle's single work of fiction, Sartor Resartus, is often considered 
one of the seminal texts of the Victorian era (McSweeney, Introduction i) and, as 
such, foundational to Victorian identity, any study discussing breadth and 
effectiveness of the field of change and its implementation would necessitate both a 
consideration ofthis "novel" (a fraught term in this case) and how the work's attempt 
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to affect others was executed, as well as the level of its achievement. With this in 
mind and using a template constructed through a consideration of the work of 1. L. 
Austin, Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler, 1 will be considering the gap between the 
performative intentions of the author of Sartor and the actual performative effects that 
are attributed to the work. Using the constructions ofthese three theorists, this 
chapter will discuss the different methodologies used to construct and implement a 
performative speech/written act, the way in which that act is disseminated, as well as 
the final production of that act. Through the delineation of this pro cess and its effect, 
1 will open a discourse on the space necessary to allow for and implement change, 
both in the policies and laws of the govemment and the identity of Victorians as a 
population as weil as individually. 
Carrying forward this idea of the gaps and spaces that are necessary for change, 
my second chapter is an approach to both the work of Lewis Carroll and the tension 
that has recently been hypothesized as existing between his public and private 
identities. Employing the gap that lies between a new and highly confrontational 
biography of Carroll written by Karoline Leach and the stories that have composed 
the accepted biography of Carroll for an hundred years, 1 will begin my discourse, 
using both Butler' s work on recognition from Undoing Gender and Hegel' s Master 
and Slave dialogue from Phenomenology of Spirit in an effort to deconstruct the 
search for identity that takes place in Alice 's Adventures in Wonderland. As weil, 
within this scrutiny ofCarroll's investigation of the constructions ofidentity, 1 will 
expand my discourse on the gaps between his public and private personae into a 
consideration of his textual methodologies and proclivities through which he employs 
4 
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gaps ofmeaning in wordplay. The resulting creation offers intriguing reflections of 
the society within which the work was produced and is suggestive of the rapid 
.. " ... 
changes that epitomize the era. 
My final chapter will be on George Eliot' s Middlemarch, and will focus on not 
only the gaps between expectations and results that figure so large in this novel, but, 
as weil, with the back side ofthat consideration. For George Eliot not only 
emphasized the discontinuity ofher character's expectations versus the outcome of 
their actions, but dealt as weil with the ramifications of such misaligned expectations. 
Hers is a discussion not only of the prudent and productive methodology by which to 
approach life, but also with the results that occur when the appropriate techniques are 
not employed. Throughout her work, Eliot is intent on the chasms that open wide at 
the feet ofso many ofher characters and, utilizing Hegel and Butler's theories of 
recognition, 1 will consider the attempts of her characters to move forward through 
the maze of their personal and public relations (keeping in mind that these mazes are 
of their own making) and whether the chasms that open as their expectations are 
refuted are spaces of productivity or despair - new beginnings with enhanced 
information, or cul-de-sacs. 
Each of the se novels with their differing interests and focuses are indicators of 
the nature of change and its attendant discontinuities, and how that change manifests 
itselfin the author's milieu ofinterest. For each ofthese writers different positions, 
concems and, consequently, different aIterations were considered necessary and 
important, but what ail three have in common is an understanding of the space 
necessary to affect that change. As England approached sweeping modifications in 
the arenas ofpolitical reform, women's rights and abolition, to name just a few, how 
the country was to navigate across each of the gulfs that separated the quaking status 
quo from the stability that a successful change promised was of paramount 
importance. Each ofthese thinkers was presenting their own ideas as to the way in 
which these dangerous - but necessary - adjustments might be made, with differing 
ideas about whether their "suggestions" needed to be a solid matrix for the future or 
merely an indicator ofwhich direction in which it might be best to travel. The 
combined result ofthese and other works of the era can be considered as a potential 
map leading Victorians forward through a fiightening, thrilling and unavoidable new 
world. 
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Chapter One 
Tailoring the Margins: Perfonnative Utterance and the Performative 
in Thomas Carlyle's.Sartor Resartus 
Identity is not something planted in us to be discovered, but something 
that is performatively produced by acts that "effectively constitute the 
identity they are said to express or reveal." (Butler quoted by Leitch 
2487) 
For neither in tailoring nor in legislating does man proceed by mere 
Accident, but the hand is ever guided on by mysterious operations of 
the mind. In ail his Modes and habilatory endeavours an Architectural 
Idea will be found lurking; his Body and Cloth are the site and 
materials whereon and whereby his beautified edifice, of a Person, is 
to be built. (Carlyle, Sartor 28) 
How and from what are our identities constructed? Did the Victorians 
construct theirs differently? Did a Londoner in Dickens' time have more control over 
his/her identity than a laborer in Sussex? - what about a laborer in Calcutta? These 
are questions that are apposite today and were, although regarded through a different 
morallens, hugely relevant in Victorian England. Ideas regarding the formation of 
identity, depending on the ideological methodology we use, have ranged from earth 
in combination with God's intervention, through genetics and/or environ mental 
influences. But it is there, with that word "influence," that 1 wish to begin this 
chapter. How Victorians were influenced, how we influence and are influenced 
today, the methodology by which one human being attempts to adjust another's 
behavior is foundational to human interaction whether that interaction is violent or 
coercive - wh ether it is enacted through enticement or edict. For the Victorians, with 
imperialism creating a pressing need to influence huge numbers and varieties of 
peoples in widely dispersed locals while maintaining a recognizable national identity, 
the question of how influence was effected was of paramount importance. 
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For Thomas Carlyle wielding that influence was a central motivation. Gerry 
Brookes notes in The Rhetorical Form of Carlyle 's "Sartor Resartus," that "[i]deas, 
in readily quotable form, lie waiting on every page" (5) ofthis odd construction that 
is halflecture, halffantasy.l Carlyle intended that rus words be portable, able to be 
inserted into any life and productive of change within that life, a style of influence 
that smacks of the performative - words before existence. But was Sartor Resartus 
actually intended as a performative text? And if it was, did it produce the influence 
Carlyle intended? In order to consider these questions we will need to step back and 
consider the mechanics of influence and performativity. 
That we are influenced by forces outside ourselves is an idea that few would 
question; we see attempted influence (both overt and covert) literally everywhere, 
including within the performative words used to define us. As Michel Foucault, 
Louis Althusser, and Judith Butler have ail noted, the influences that form our 
behavior are posited in numerous methodologies: advertisements, laws and 
punishments, the ideologies through which we interact with the world, in the 
information we receive from our parents indicating "correct" social behavior that we 
reenact over and over again. Judith Butler would say that these forces not only 
influence but construct our behavior, and as weil, our identities - that they are the 
warp and weft of our personae - that, "( s )uch acts, gestures, enactments, generally 
construed are performative in the sense that the essence or identity that they otherwise 
purport to express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal 
signs and other discursive means" (Gender 185). 
1 Brookes' text argues that Sartor Resartus is not strictly a vehicle with which to present Carlyle's 
ideas of a proper life, but for the purposes ofthis essay, it is that vehicular element of Sartor that 1 am 
emphasizing. 
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When Judith Butler wrote Gender Trouble, her "key statement on 
performative accounts of cultural meaning" (Leitch 2485), she was extending and 
evolving the theory that J. L. Austin had introduced in the 1950s through his lectures 
at Oxford University. His theory in the form of notes from those lectures was 
posthumously published as the text How 10 Do Things With Words and in the 
lecture/essay "Performative Utterances" from the text Philosophical Papers. In both 
texts he defined performative utterances as speech acts that are "doing something 
rather than merely saying something" (Austin 222). Jacques Derrida took Austin's 
ideas and in his essay "Signature, Event, Context" added the concepts of "citation" 
and "reiteration," presenting us with a performative speech act that, through those 
methods of citation and reiteration, would shed its intentionality and "split, 
dissociat(ing) from itselfthe pure singularity of the event" (326). Dealing with 
Austin's idea ofperlocution (the effect of the utterance), Derrida has to say: 
Differing from the classical assertion, from the constative utterance, 
the performative's referent. . . is not outside it, or in any case 
preceding it or before it. It do es not describe something which exists 
outside and before language. It pro duces or transforms a situation, it 
operates . . . (3 21) 
From here, Butler would expand Derrida's concept of production and transformation 
to develop her theory of performativity, demonstrating that we are not "natural" 
creatures that simply occur, but instead are constructions ofthat hegemony that we 
reside within. But the idea that we are not creatures that merely occur was not a new 
one, rather it brings us firmly back to the mid-nineteenth-century and Carlyle. 
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ln September of 1830, when Carlyle tirst began writing Sartor Resartus he 
was investigating the idea of the construction of both "mankind" and the institutions 
with which "he,,2 surrounds himself, but both his intention and the text itselfwent far 
beyond a simple exploration. 1 wou Id argue that Carlyle set out to create a 
performative text that would attempt to direct and detine a proper mode ofbehavior 
and belieffor the British people.3 Using the theories of Austin, Derrida and Butler as 
a template, 1 would like to consider this seminal text of the Victorian era in order to 
consider Carlyle's intentions and compare those to that which was actually produced 
as weIl as the moral implications ofthat production. It is in the gap between the two 
that we tind the a mode of the performative utterance that Butler discusses in her 
essay "Contagious Word: Paranoia and 'Homosexuality' in the Military," a version 
ofperformativity that institutions have been trying (with varied success) to implement 
for centuries. In writing Sartor Resartus, Carlyle was attempting to apply just such a 
methodology. 
That Carlyle influenced the creation of the Victorian psyche is not in doubt. 
According to the introduction to the Oxford World's Classic 1999 edition, "Sartor 
Resartus is the seminal expression of the thought of the most influential of the 
Victorian cultural prophets" (McSweeney, Introduction i). As weil, in 1855 George 
Eliot noted that "there is hardly a superior or active mind ofthis generation that has 
not been modifiedby Carlyle's writings; there has hardly been an English book 
2 For the purposes ofthis chapter, in reference to Carlyle's text 1 will he using Carlyle's referent "man" 
and the appropriate pronouns. 
3 Vienne Rundle in "'Devising New Means': Sarlor Resarlus and the Devoted Reader" suggests that 
''the vehemence of readers' responses to Sarlor Resartus derives in faet from the text's action upon its 
reader: an action tbat oversteps the bounds of the conventional con tract hetween text and reader in 
ways whlch may be considered unfair, underhanded or even unethical" (13). This suggestion of 
manipulation implies coercion. 
Il 
written for the last ten or twelve years that would not have been different if Carlyle 
had not lived" (Eliot, Essays 213-214 emphasis mine). That designation of "cultural 
prophet" (the word prophet implies pre-knowledge) and Eliot' s characterization of 
Carlyle's writing as able to "modify" minds proclaims Carlyle as an agent of 
performativity. There is, as weil, no doubt that Carlyle intended to influence a world 
which he considered as changing quickly, in sorne distress, and in need of direction -
calling the times in which he was writing "mad" in a letter to Emerson (Carlyle, 
Correspondence VI, 70). Before Sartor Resartus was pub li shed (even in seriaI form), 
Carlyle wrote to his brother John, "1 have a notion that 1 can make rather a good Book 
of it, and one above ail likely to produce sorne desirable impression on the world 
even now . .. (Carlyle, Letters V, 215 emphasis mine). So, Carlyle's intent was to 
sway society or, even further, to write words that would act as a progenitor to a new 
mode of British behavior and attitude. The question ofwhether it was a productive 
attempt (setting aside for the moment any moral ramifications ofthat intent) would 
likely be answered quite differently depending on who was asked and where that 
person perceived the parameters ofthat performativity to lie. To consider that 
question 1 would like to begin with Austin, Carlyle and Sartor Resartus. 
As 1 discussed above, Carlyle clearly intended to have an effect, so, through 
the lens of Austin's theory of the performative utterance, a speech act that performs 
an action rather than merely describing that action, Carlyle's performative utterance is 
posited in the act of proselytizing. In Sartor there is a clear description of correct 
behavior according to a specifically constructed system and, despite the text's refusaI 
to follow a linear form, Carlyle's "new Truth" (Sartor 8) is stated with little 
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equivocation. This idea of a "new Truth" is relevant to my construction of a 
performative intention in Carlyle. In Vanessa L. Ryan's essay, "Sartor Resartus and 
the Art ofBiography," she discusses the formation oftrus idea of a "new Truth" 
through the creation of a connection between biography and fiction, noting that 
"Carlyle is careful to resolve the possible tension between his defense of the 
imaginative art ofbiography and his claim that history is but 'innumerable 
Biographies.' Fiction, he writes, is 'mimic Biography'" adding that our appetites are 
only satisfied wh en such stories "are grounded in reality" (297) and thus grants 
forgiveness to his own habituaI use of fictional characters, while elevating his fiction 
through its ties to biography. She also notes that, employing his preferred 
methodological use offictional characters (a tactic that allows much greater latitude 
in accu rate representation), Carlyle uses afictional character, Professor Gottfried 
Sauerteig, to make an attack on fiction. Sauerteig states that "[f]iction , while the 
feigner of it knows that he is feigning, partakes, more than we suspect, of the nature 
oflying" (Carlyle, Essays III, 54). Despite the ironic distortion ofboundaries that 
thîs blending offact and fiction creates, Ryan makes the point that "Sauerteig's rigid 
differentiation [creation of a gap] between fact and fiction enables Carl yle to 
introduce a third term" (297) - Carlyle' s "new Truth, what we can call a Revelation" 
(Essays, vol. 3, 54). It is trus "new Truth" that, once freed from the bonds of formaI 
biography, as it is in Sartor, acts as both content and platform from which to enact the 
performative utterance of proselytizing. So now let us consider just how Carlyle 
structures that action. 
13 
Carlyle's protagonist, Teufelsdrockh, is a Gennan philosopher whose ideas 
are being introduced to the British public through the efforts of the enthusiastic, if 
occasionally unreliable, narration of the "Editor," who, with sorne confusion, but a 
strong instinct that Teufelsdrockh's ideas are important (a new Truth) outlines those 
ideas for the reader.4 ln the style of Sterne' s The Life and Opinions of Tristram 
Shandy, the text continues through a confusing conglomeration of memory, 
biographical "evidence" and epiphany. The result is Teufelsdrockh's primary theory, 
his "Philosophy of Clothes" introduced on page four, in which ail extraneous 
creations of man are labeled as clothes which define, coyer and obscure the light of 
the "soul." And, now, for a moment 1 would like to step away from structure and 
consider performative content, as this idea of clothing as construction is an idea 
which brings Judith Butler to mind. 
T 0 compare the perfonnance of gender to the wearing of clothes (the clothes 
having been produced by an outside force) is a temptation when discussing Butler' s 
theories - a temptation that in most cases should be avoided. However, Sarah Salih, 
makes the observation that: 
To describe gender as a 'doing' and a corporeal style might lead you to 
think of it as an activity that resembles choosing an outfit from an 
already existing wardrobe of clothes. Although Butler explicitly 
refutes this analogy in . . Bodies that Matter it may serve our purposes 
to begin. (50) 
4 Brookes notes that the editor is important, because the use of fictional voices allowed Carlyle to 
"introduce stories of the supernatural ironically in order to make them acceptable to a scientific 
modem age" (22). Once again we become aware of the latitude which adds credibility to what might 
otherwise be considered to be a personal rant 
14 
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So, keeping in mind that Butler' s theory demands an outside construction as the 
generative force behind that performance pf identity (both gender and other) and 
while not wishing to simplify the complexities ofher work, it would be nearly 
1 
impossible, if not outright irresponsible, to discuss Carlyle's text with its central 
1 
theme of "the Philosophy ofClothes" through the lens of Butler's theory of the 
1 
i 
performative and not discuss clothing. For Carlyle, in his own way posits a similar 
theory and uses cIothing in order to do so! 
Carlyle too presents us with the id~a that much of our identity - or at least 
much of the routine and behavior of our daily lives - is exterior. The work a man 
does, the political party he joins, the religious institution he attends: ail are wom as 
cIothing. 
Men are properly said to be cIothed with Authority, cIothed with 
Beauty, with Curses, and ttte like. Nay ifyou consider it, what is Man 
himself, and his whole terrestrial Life, but an Emblem; a Clothing or 
visible Garment for that divine Me ofhis, cast hither, like a light-
particle, down from Heav~n? Thus is he said also to be cIothed with a 
Body. (Sartor 57) 
! 
In this excerpt the similarities to Butler are cIear, but then Carlyle takes goes on to 
say: 
Thus in this one pregnant ~ubject Clothes, rightly understood, is 
incIuded ail that men have; thought dreamed, done and been: the 
whole extemal Universe and what it holds is but Clothing; and the 
essence of ail science lies in the Plill.,OSOPHY OF CLOTHES. 
(Sartor 57-58) 
15 
So Carlyle, with his definition of clothes as encompassing not only literai clothing but 
as weil such institutions as religion, governmental structures, social customs, etcetera, 
parallels Butler' s theory of the exterior construction of gender identity. But it is at 
this point the two part company, as Carlyle, with an agenda ofutopian improvement, 
defines clothes as merely an impediment to wisdom, or as Teufelsdrockh states, "[t]he 
beginning of ail Wisdom is to look fixedly on Clothes or even with armed eyesight, 
till they become transparent' (Sartor 52).5 This would certainly not be Butler's 
position; for Butler the perfonnative is not so easily bypassed and the clothes never 
become transparent (rather they must be altered). 
It is important to take note of Carlyle' s use of rhetorical devices to create 
authority, starting with the biblicallanguage with which Sartor Resartus abounds. 
Carlyle was conflicted when it came to religion, as were many Victorians. Margot K. 
Louise makes the point in her essay "Gods and Mysteries: The Revival ofPaganism 
and the Remaking ofMythography through the Nineteenth Century" that "the 
elevation ofMystery was a very nineteenth-century agenda" and was furthered in 
"opposition both to rationalism and to a dogmatic Christianity" (329); she follows this 
statement with Carlyle's passage in which he posits religion in the "froth ocean" that 
is "LITERATURE" (Sartor 191). Certainly, Carlyle could be considered as one of 
the coterie attempting to elevate Mystery over dogma, and Sartor Resartus, as it 
lumps the church with ail other fonns of"Clothes," would have to be considered 
5 William Keenan credits Carlyle as the progenitor and Sartor Resartus as the seminal text that 
"inaugurated the field of dress studies by giving the subject of clothes its first sustained systematic 
scrutiny" (2). Although an interesting idea, 1 would consider Keenan's statement to he something of 
an inversion, as Carlyle was instructing bis readers to see beyond clothing rather than implementing 
the intense focus that such a field implies and Keenan's text at times fuIfills. As G. B. Tennyson notes 
"Carlyle fashions the clothes metaphor less to apparel society than to denude it" (286). 
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critical of the religious institutions of the day. Neitzsche made the comment that "[a]t 
bottom Carlyle is an English atheist who makes it a point ofhonor not to be one" 
(198). So, despite the rhetoric Carlyle employs, Sartor would not be considered a 
religious book by religious institutions, rather, the religious language and biblical 
style are founded in an attempt to garner authority - that platform from which to 
proselytize 'that 1 spoke of earlier - as are many of the rhetorical devices used in the 
tex!, for as a persuasive and probably performative text, authority must figure large. 
But who exactly is it that holds that authority? 
ln her es say, "Devising New Means: Sartor Resartus and the Devoted 
Reader," Vivienne Rundle makes the statement that Carlyle created a "new mode of 
narrative authority which questions its own grounds for existence" (19). She notes 
that by placing the sometimes unreliable Editor between Teufelsdrockh and the 
reader, shifting the narrative voice between three characters (the Editor, 
Teufelsdrockh and Heuschrecke) and calling into question the authority of any 
narrative text with the Editor's comment of"what reader expects that, with aIl our 
writing and reporting, Teufelsdrockh could be brought home to him ... " (Carlyle, 
Sartor 21) the bonds tying the "new Truth" are 100sened.6 This "new mode" of 
narrative authority sets free the underlying point in just the way Carlyle seeks to free 
the soul from its garments (Rundle 19). In this way, the "philosophy of clothes" is 
detached from any single character and, embedded with an authority aIl its own, is 
allowed to transcend the merely human and (hopefully) ascend to the position of 
unqualified "Truth." Rundle also discusses the concept of the "negative shape," in 
6 In a similar vein, Ryan makes the statement that Carlyle's '''unreliable editor' emphasizes the artistic 
and literary aspect of biography, rather than its daim to be the authentic representation of historical 
facts" (290). 
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which the babbling of the Editor defines the outline of the Die Kleider, 
Teufelsdrockh's own text (15), stating that this negative space defines and outlines a 
text too large for words (a return to the destabilized authority of the narrative) (16). 
Here 1 would like to point out as weil that by filling the negative space Carlyle 
effectively disallows any interior pressure that might adjust the shape ofhis ideas-
for if the negative space is already filled, where can one adjust to? 
Ali ofthese powerful and deftly handled rhetorical means were necessary if 
the text was to accomplish the goal that Carlyle had set out for it. For Sartor Resartus 
can be considered as Carlyle's outline to build a better person - rus matrix for a 
superman with which to construct a superior society. This matrix or mould could not 
be adjustable if it was to act as a cast with which to build a new "man" for whom 
Carlyle had a specific criteria. That criteria was constructed around a need to free 
the soul from earthly institutions Gust as Rundle suggests the clothes philosophy is 
freed from any one narrator's authority) in order that the soul be ready to (here 
Carlyle quotes Goethe) "[d]o the dut y that lies nearest thee" (Sartor 148). It is in an 
effort to present this command - and it is framed as a command - that Carlyle 
employs ail of the se stratagem, including the aforementioned biblicallanguage and 
shifting narrative voice, as weil as more novelistic techniques such as humor and 
romance, to create a book in the tradition that Robert Alter described as "express[ing] 
its seriousness through playfulness, that is acutely aware of itself as a mere structure 
of words even as it tries to discover ways of going beyond words to the experiences 
words seek to indicate" (ix) . Certainly Sartor is playful, but there is no question that 
Carlyle - despite ail that play - made rus edict in earnest. 
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There has been, over the years, a variety ofresponses to Carlyle's work. In 
Blackwell's A Companion to Victorian Literature and Culture, Hilary Schor writes 
about what she calls Carlyle's "insanely didactic Sartor Resartus" that contains 
"fragments of social vision and prophecy" (326). In the same volume, Linda Peterson 
comments on how his blending ofbiblical style and rhetoric "helped to formulate the 
concept of the 'sage writer' [and how] Carlyle drew on the features ofOld Testament 
prophecy (hence the sometimes interchangeable terminology of 'sage' or 'prophef)" 
(375). Ali ofwhich lent weight and credibility to Carlyle's potentially performative 
words, working to build a text that, although certainly hyperbolic, is stirring and, as 
the quotes 1 cited at the beginning ofthis chapter make clear, influential, even ifthat 
influence did not ultimately correspond with Carlyle's intent. 
So, accepting that Sartor was indeed influential, my question becomes, when 
does the influential become the performative and at what point do proselytizing and 
performativity blend or part company? Is performativity in the intent, the 
methodology used, or the produced construction? The least ephemeral answer is in 
the third choice. As Carlyle had a specific result in mind and was intending that his 
words bring that result to - in sorne ways - a material realization, he likely would 
have declared his text to be unsuccessful in the attainment ofhis goals. By the 
"hungry 40s" Carlyle's "earlier generosity of spirit seems to have evaporated in the 
increasingly shrill harangues" (poston 16) that were possibly expressing frustration 
and disappointment with a world that had not lived up to the shining ideas posited 
within his proselytizing utterance. But in fact, ifwe slide forward into the more 
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recent past and the present to the theories of Derrida and particularly Butler, we can 
look at Carlyle's "utterance" quite differently. 
Ifwe, as observers, step away from Carlyle's desire and disappointment in his 
wish to construct a specific British society in line with his own ideas ofwhat would 
be best, we can find many suggestions ofButier's theory on both the micro and macro 
scale in Sartor Resartus. Let us begin with the micro - the text itself - specifically 
with the protagonists name, Diogenes Teufelsdrockh, which translates to god-born 
devil-shit, and let us consider that name in conjunction with Butler's discussion of 
excrement. The similarity is not coincidental, but rather is informed by important 
positions within the texts. 
In Gender Trouble, Butler discusses bodily contours and boundaries, quoting 
Mary Douglas' statement that "the body is a model that can stand for any bounded 
system. Its boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened or 
precarious" (180). Butler goes on to note that Douglas "suggests that aIl social 
systems are vulnerable at their margins and that ail margins are accordingly 
considered dangerous" (180). So, Butler hypothesizes, in the case ofhomosexual 
intercourse it is both the physical margins and the societal margins that are at issue 
(180). Keeping this in mind, the name Teufelsdrockh takes on a specific meaning. If 
society is most vulnerable at its margins, the writer who attempts to become a 
performative agent must approach via those margins in order to affect the norms. 
Dealing directly with those margins and the idea of excrement, Butler remarks: 
What constitutes through division the "inner" and "outer" worlds of 
the subject is a border and boundary tenuously maintained for the 
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purposes of social regulation and control. The boundary between the 
inner and outer is confounded by those excremental passages in which 
the inner etTectively becomes outer, and this excreting function 
becomes, as it were, the model by which other forms of identity-
ditTerentiation are accomplished. In etTect, this is the mode by which 
Other's become shit. (Gender 182) 
Also, in noting Kristeva's discussion of the abject, Butler makes the observation that 
"[t]his appears as an expulsion of alien elements, but the alien is etTectively 
established through this expulsion" (Gender 181). So in order for Teufelsdrockh to 
approach those vulnerable margins - the position from which change is possible - he 
must be refigured by expulsion. He is repeatedly expelled: by his adoptive mother; 
by his love, Blumine; by bis own desperation in "The Everlasting Nay"; and, finally, 
there is his name - "devil-shit" - which could be constituted as a double expulsion. 
For Teufelsdrockh this series of expulsions are the "excremental passage" through 
which he must pass in order to become alien and to gain perspective from which to 
comment. 
Boundaries, extremities and perspective are extremely important throughout 
Sarlor Resartus. It is important, for instance, that Teufelsdrockh is a German 
Prof essor from the town ofWeissnichtwo - Know-not-where - suggesting once again 
a position on the margin. It is important as weil that he resides in a Watchtower that : 
... might truly be called the pinnacle ofWeissnichtwo, for it rose sheer 
up above the contiguous roofs, themselves rising from the elevated 
ground. Moreover, with its windows, it looked toward ail the four 
Orle [points of the compass] . . . wherefrom, sitting at ease, he might 
see the whole li fe-circulation ofthat considerable City. (Carlyle, 
Sarlor 16) 
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Here, we are presented with the necessary perspective for Teufelsdrockh to become a 
sage. This positioning on high (keeping in mind that it is accompanied by its opposite 
- the depths of despair) is certainly purposeful on the part of Carlyle; who better to 
have wisdom to otTer than the sage at the top of sorne exalted peak, a trope so 
ubiquitous that today we find it even in comic strips. But what is interesting is that 
this position also, and rather oddly, conjoins Butler' s section on excrement where, 
after discussing the "Other" as shit, she goes on to say: 
'Inner' and 'outer' make sense only with reference to a mediating 
boundary that strives for stability. And this stability, this coherence, is 
determined in large part by cultural orders that sanction the subject and 
compel its ditTerentiation from the abject. Hence, 'inner' and 'outer' 
constitute a binary distinction that stabilizes and consolidates the 
coherent subject. (Gender 182) 
This inner/outer stabilization is reflected in the balancing act within which both 
Sartor Resartus as a text and Teufelsdrockh as a character are engaged. This balance 
or pendulum swing is figured in: Teufelsdrockh's name, god-bom devil-shit; the 
chapter titles "The Everlasting Nay" versus "The Everlasting Yea"; and his rejection 
by loved ones versus the editor's adulation. Despite the fact that his name, Diogenes, 
suggests that Teufelsdrockh is central to "God," the one place on earth that we never 
find him is at the center. Rather he swings from one edge to the other, bringing us 
back to ButJer's idea ofthose vulnerable margins. But it is necessary to Carlyle's 
construction (not Butler's) that by the time Teufelsdrockh is wise enough to be 
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counseling the editor and reader, he is at the heights rather than the depths. For 
Butler, any margin is vulnerable and consequently productive. 
Teufelsdrockh has visited the depths, specifically, "thick curtains ofNight 
rushed over his soul, as rose the immeasurable Crash ofDoom; and through the ruins 
as of a shivered Uni verse, was he falling, falIing, towards the Abyss" (Carlyle, Sartor 
112). Certainly hyperbolic, but it is lines like these which remind us that Thomas 
Carlyle was, generationally speaking, ofthe Romantics; this connection is important 
for this particular discourse because the Romantics were in many ways set apart from 
their readers. Revering and writing of nature (Carlyle did as weil), authors like 
Wordsworth and Byron were expected to stand apart with emotions and experiences 
bigger than Iife, and the poetry and representation of those emotions and experiences 
were to be handed down from on high. It is here that Denida's theory of citation and 
reiteration cornes into play, creating an idea of public display - of a public body for 
whom this re-presentation of an intensely vivid reality would be repeated, performed 
or publicly read to become a part ofwho that British public was. The shift that 
Carlyle made was not in the form of presentation, but in the message - that one 
should "( d)o the dut y that lies nearest thee," an idea that differed a great deal from the 
leisure preferring, c1ass based society that had existed previously. This message is far 
more proactive and performative than Wordsworth's wandering "Ionely as a cloud," 
although those images of"lonely c1ouds" and, particularly, Byron's exotic Turkish 
Giaour were performative in creating an England that "othered" foreign ideas and 
peoples. They also informed the adventures ofCarlyle's Teufelsdrockh. 
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Teufelsdrockh has much in common with these hugely popular, but removed, 
heroes that were embodied in both the texts and the lives of the Romantics, and so, in 
Book II, Chapter 6 he retreats from his great disappointment in love to the huge and 
rugged mountains - once again we see that wisdom cornes from Butler' s "outer" 
rather than the "inner." Here, it is bard to say whether the wisdom that Teufelsdrockh 
gains and then compiles into bis "Philosophy of Clothes" cornes from within bimself 
or from the great unknown, but what is absolutely clear is that it does not come from 
within society and the social norms. And it is here that 1 would like to extend our 
consideration ofButier's theory. 
Although Butler figures her "other" as excrement, she also makes clear that 
even after being expelled, that "other" has limited choice. Going back to Sara Silah' s 
anal ogy of outfits, Silah notes that within Butler's theory, although expelled, you: 
could not simply reinvent your metaphorical gender wardrobe or 
acquire an entirely new one ... [r]ather, you would have to alter the 
clothes you already have in order to signal that you are not wearing 
them in a 'conventional' way - by ripping them or sewing sequins on 
them or wearing them back to front or upside down.(50) 
This need to adjust one' s "ward robe" presents us with Butler' s theory of subversive 
acts in wbich gender identity is transformed in such ways as drag performance or 
cross dressing - a form of"altering" the "clothes" - in which she states that "[t]his 
perpetuai displacement constitutes a fluidity of identities that suggests an openness to 
resignification and recontextualization" (Gender 188). It is that space between the 
material gender of the performer' s body and the performance of a different gender 
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that allows for change in perceptions and, consequently, in the dynamic by which 
social relations are defined: ln this way subversive acts become a method by which 
one can push against that already filled negative space ofRundle's, a way of forcing a 
gap in the predetermined, normative constructions. In Sartor Resartus, it is 
Teufelsdrockh's disappearances, the gaps in his presence/existence trom which he 
returns with new wisdom. Those gaps allow wisdom to be acquired, just as Butler's 
gaps allow for resignification. So again we find that on the micro level, in the details, 
there is a remarkable number of ideas shared by Carlyle and Butler on what 
constitutes both an "other" and the required site and conditions for change. Now let 
us go back to the macro level, back to the influential text versus the performative text. 
In her essay, "Contagious Word: Paranoia and 'Homosexuality' in the 
Military," Butler discusses a style of the performative that is far less subtle and, 
consequently, more directly posited in power and force than the reifying reiterations 
ofsocial norms. In 1. L. Austin's essay "Performative Utterances" he broaches the 
topic of the performative order such as, "Close the door," "Move your car" or (the 
fabulously appropriate statement trom Star Trek's Jean Luc Picard) "Make it so." 
Austin approaches this act trom the direction of the speaker and, as such, the only 
performative is the utterance of the order itself (238). But what about the subjective 
side of the order? Ifin response to an order an action is produced by another person, 
does that constitute an expansion of the performative utterance? 
With the theory advanced in "Contagious Word" Butler suggests that it might 
do just that, outlining how in a U.S. Military statement ofregulations the words, '''1 
am homosexual,' do not merely describe; they are figured as performing what they 
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describe, not only in the sense that they constitute the speaker as a homosexual, but 
that they constitute the speech as homosexual conduct" (142). It is an interesting 
position, since in general such utterances would be considered descriptive rather than 
performative; if 1 say "1 am tired" 1 am describing my state rather than producing it. 
So, at first glance, this seems to be an edict about the import ofwords, but as those 
words would be spoken by sorne "other" within the military, has not the spectrum of 
the performative been expanded? ln Butler' s words a declaration that one is a 
"homosexual becomes, within the terms ofthis law, not merely the representation of 
conduct ... but offensive conduct itself' (Contagious 146). The drafters ofthese 
regulations appear to be creating a double - possibly triple - performative: the 
original order; the figuring of words as performative of"homosexual conduct"; and 
finally, if the words constitute a performative act within the auspices of the military, 
then the speaker ofthose words would be making an utterance that performatively 
produces his/her identity whether or not they have committed a material homosexual 
act or even truly consider themselves as homosexual. One wonders just how far this 
might go, if the statement itself is figured as an homosexual act does that include 
instances when it is spoken in jest or sorne other deceptive manner? Does the very 
act of uttering those words construct the speaker as homosexual regardless of 
circumstance? AlI of these complications were likely more than the drafters of this 
regulation bargained for and the regulation was repealed. But it is the attempt that is 
interesting; for this use of a direct edict to construct an identity within chosen 
delimitations is an endeavor by the U. S. Military to find a shortcut in the 
organization and delineation of humanity. 
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So how does this figure in terms of Carlyle and his text? This performative 
act by the military is, in fact, the very act that Carlyle appears to have been attempting 
in his writing of Sartor Resartus. Ifwe consider the methodology he employed to 
gain authority, the positioning of the characters, his comments to friends and family 
and his growing bitterness, it is reasonable to suppose that Carlyle was not only 
attempting to indicate (the performative utterance of indicating) his thoughts about 
appropriate behavior for an Englishman, but as weIl, was trying to produce an English 
subject that did "the dut y that lay nearest" him in an attempt to create a better 
England. It is a style of performative speech that institutions have been attempting 
for a very long time - a methodology that powers the church, government, and many 
other regulatory institution. It is also a form of performative utterance (or edict) that 
requires a great deal of control - thus its placement within the military which is 
defined by strict command over the enlisted. Carlyle, not possessing the power or 
authority of the military, could merely proselytize, persuade and hope for the best 
and, as an idealist, was doomed to fall into frustration and bitterness. 
ln ail likelihood, it is only the military or a totalitarian state that can use such 
overt modes of the performative to construct identities, and then only with limited 
success. Controlling the actions and identity of the "other" is difficult (not to mention 
morally suspect), and so, such controls are embedded within our normative social 
structures through - as Derrida discussed - citation and reiteration. Although 1 am 
extrapolating, it seems reasonable that, considering Carlyle's legendary 
disillusionment and frustration through his later years, his own interpretation ofthe 
results ofhis attempt at creating a performative (our word - not his) text was failure. 
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With only a limited faith in human nature and an enlightenment based belief in the 
improvement of mankind to a greater being, he likely was deeply embittered by the 
continued growth of commerce, industrialism and increasing size of govemment. 
Even before Sartor Resartus was published his hopes were colored, as he expressed 
in a letter to James Fraser dated May 27, 1833: 
There are only five persons that have yet read this Manuscript: of 
whom two have expressed themselves (I mean convinced me that they 
are) considerably interested and gratified; two quite struck, 
'overwhelmed with astonishment and new hope' (this is the result 1 
aimed at for souls worthy ofhope) ... (Carlyle, Letters VI, 396) 
It is the words "souls worthy ofhope," with their inherent and inescapable value 
judgment, that finally lead me to believe in both Carlyle's wish and his intention to 
create a performative text - to build a new world in which those "worthy of hope" 
might define and create identities for those "other" unworthy souls. As weIl, it is 
those words that convince me of his inevitable disillusionment. 
With each reading of Sartor Resartus, with its flights of ecstasy and hyperbolic 
reaches to glory, 1 become more convinced that Carlyle considered himself as 
offering freedom to those who understood his words, and for many of his readers he 
may have been a gift: an opening gap, a widening horizon. But despite any laudable 
results, 1 am convinced that Carlyle did not make this gift without attempting to 
attach strings. Rather, 1 believed he wished his creation to be understood and used 
within his own ideas, making his offering one comprised of limited and constricting 
bonds - the delimited methodology of one man's idea ofidentity and fulfillment. 
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It is interesting that Carlyle would share images and ideas with a mind such as 
Judith Butler's, considering Butler's interest is in reducing and distorting the bonds of 
constructed and imposed identity, but, in fact, as 1 have discussed, there are numerous 
similarities despite their positions on opposite sides of the performative fence. As to 
which si de of the fence Carlyle is on, it is important to remember that, as the above' 
letter indicates, Carlyle did intend his text to build a style ofthought - a new and 
reformed world - and, in fact, it is likely that his command to "(d)o the dut y that lies 
nearest thee" had a serious effect and could, indeed, be considered performative as to 
the creation of the Victorian persona. Certainly the privileging ofwork as valuable 
was a defining characteristic ofVictorian England, as Ford Maddox Brown's painting 
"Work" implies. It is no coincidence that Carlyle himself stands within this image, 
watching as the "worthy" people below him set to their given tasks. Certainly 
Thomas Carlyle's words helped craft mu ch ofwhat the Victorians were noted for and, 
considering the imperial reach ofVictorian England, many of the effects with which a 
large portion of the world would have to cope. 
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ChapterTwo 
Between the ''l''s: Shifting Identity and Hegel's Theory of Recognition in Lewis 
Carroll's Alice's Adventures in Wonder/and 
"Who are you?" said the Caterpillar. 
This was not an encouraging opening for a conversation. Alice 
replied, rather shyly, "1 - 1 hardly know, Sir, just at present - at least 1 
know who 1 was when 1 got up this morning, but 1 think 1 must have 
been changed several times since then." (Carroll, Alice 84) 
The cool inquiry of the implacable Caterpillar in Lewis Carroll's 
groundbreaking volume of children's literature, Alice 's Adventures in Wonderland, 
is a good - and important - question both for Alice and for Victorian society as a 
whole. Despite Thomas Carlyle's attempts to build a new and cohesive Victorian 
identity, rapid changes in the areas of science, philosophy and industrialization had 
destabilized ideas about cIass, religion, and government, and consequently the 
identity of Victorians had come into question. Roles that had been dictated and 
fixed began to shift and change, much like Alice's identity in Carroll's story, 
leaving gaps and spaces for yet more change to occur. It is with these productive 
spac.es in mind, spaces between comprehended and perceived identities, different 
word significations and shifting behaviors, that 1 wish to consider Carroll's text. 
Using Hegel's theory of recognition as outlined in the "Master and Slave" narrative 
in his text Phenomenology of Spirit and including further work by Jessica 
Benjamin, Judith Butler and, as weil, a biography of Carroll written by Karoline 
Leach, 1 would like to consider the destabilizations that creates those spaces 
between identity and recognition. 
It is just such spaces of inquiry that Judith Butler addresses in her influential 
text, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of ldentity, presenting us with 
the gaps created by the performance of subversive acts. As 1 discussed in the last 
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chapter, in Butler's writing on the performance of drag, she states that it "plays 
upon the distinction between the anatomy of the performer and the gender that is 
béing performed" then adds a paragraph later the excerpt 1 quoted earlier, "[t]his 
perpetuai displacement constitutes a fluidity of identities that suggests an openness 
to resignification and recontextuaIization" (Gender 188). The displacement that 
Butler speaks of exists as a gap between (or a break in the correlation of) the 
anatomy and the performance of gender within the drag presentation, making it 
difficult to determine "who" (what gender) the performer is. 
For Alice too, "who one is" is not a question that is easily answered, as her 
reply to the Caterpillar makes clear. Certainly, it is not easy to answer within the 
shifting locale that Carroll has crafted; his creation, Wondedand, like Butler's 
subversive act, is a highly unstable environment where little is recognizable and 
everything is subject to change. Wherever Alice focuses attention, even - or 
perhaps especially - when that focus faIls upon her own identity, the quaking 
ground of Carroll' s constructed space shifts, forming gaps that separate the Alice of 
yesterday from the alter-Alice of the moment, and thus aIlowing questions we 
sel dom ask to emerge from their physical or societal restraints demanding to be 
reexamined. It is this reexamination, as weIl as the inherent - and productive - gap 
between the dual persona of Charles DodgsonlLewis Carroll, that characterizes the 
tex! 1 wish to begin with - Karoline Leach's very fresh representation ofCarroll's 
life. 
ln 1998 In the Shadow of The Dreamchild: A New Understanding of Lewis 
Carroll was published. Another in a long line of biographies on Carroll, Leach's 
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work differs trom other texts in its refusai to accept the ubiquitous representation 
that had been evolving over the past lOO-pius years - beginning several decades 
before Carroll' s death - of an eccentric, child revering/desiring bachelor. Rather 
than following her predecessors, Leach takes into consideration the totallack of 
available prima facie information on Carroll's life up until the 1950s in order to 
create a new idea of Carroll. Basing her theory on the fairly newly accessible, 
unexpurgated Dodgson's diaries and a list of the contents of "eut pages" within 
those diaries that she uncovered during her research among the family papers 
(Leach 50), Leach suggests that nearly ail ofCarroll's biographers, with the 
exception ofCollingwood, were working trom, at best, hearsay. Collingwood did 
have his uncle's papers to work trom in building his text, but here Leach proposes 
that we must take into account that, as a non-scholar and member of a family that 
seemed intent on keeping private much of Carroll' s life - after ail the diaries were 
not allowed to be viewed until 50 years after his death and then only in an 
expurgated version - the text should be considered as probably intended to serve 
other purposes than that of scholarship, including generating book sales and 
preserving the family reputation. (Leach 20).7 
Leach approaches Carroll's life trom the assumption that too many, ifnot 
most, of the biographies of the past have been based on mythology - ifonly 
because of a lack of direct source material - that originated trom an innocence-
7 lbat Collingwood's representation is less than precise is accepted by many biographers, even those 
who use bis text as reference material. In The Lifè of Lewis Carroll, Lennon mentions that 
Collingwood "failed to note" large gaps in the Carroll's diaries (63). Taylor, in The White Knight 
notes that Collingwood "suppressed all those [facts] wbich might have given offence" (v). That said, 
until1969, Collingwood was the only biographer to have access to unexpurgated diaries and, as such, 
was an important source. 
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craving public and was collaborated in by Carroll himself, to be carried on after his 
death by his family in an effort to maintain the privacy of a Iife that may not have 
met public standards and tastes that were already invested in the idea of a pure, 
child-Ioving Lewis Carroll. 8 That Collingwood and, almost immediately after, Isa 
Bowman, wrote with the intent of creating a myth about innocence (regardless of 
the adjustments Freudians would later make) seems particularly weIl represented by 
Collingwood's ad infinitum referencing ofCarroll's religiosity (14,51,132 ... ), his 
devotion to children and finally, Collingwood's dedication of the book to ail 
Carroll' s "childfriends.,,9 
Bowman makes her focus clear when she uses the words "little girl" no less 
than 8 times in the tirst 500 words of her text. As weil, Bowman claims to have 
been "no more than ten or eleven years old" in recounting their friendship (19), yet 
she was 13 years old when the two met and was weil over the age ofperceived 
sexual availability for the time (14 years)lO during most oftheir relationship, this 
was despite Carroll's supposed loss ofinterest in girls over the age of 12 (Leach 
25). AlI ofwhich calls into question the credibility ofBowman's story. Yet, 
according to Leach it is these first two less than scholarly "biographical" works that 
have set the stage for the figure of Carroll to saunter away in silhouette, hand in 
hand with a "little girl." Numerous biographers, including Lennon, Cohen and 
8 Stephen Canham notes in bis essay, "From Wonderland to the Marketplace: Alice's Progeny," that 
the "Alice industry ... began developing almost as the ink was drying on first editions (Carroll bimself, 
of course, did much to impel this industry)" (226). 
9 Collingwood's representation of Carroll as pure even extended to the author's organi:zational 
systems: "nest of pigeon-holes neatly labeled, showed bis love of order; shelves, filled with the best 
books on every subject that interested him were evidence of bis wide reading" (135). 
10 William Stead's articles "Maiden Tribute of Modem Babylon" published in the Pail Mali Gazette in 
1885 prompted Parliament to raise the age of consent to 16 (Roberts 208). 
34 
Taylorll would take what had been written before and would build upon and 
exp and that already extant story. 
Leach begins her account differently, taking the stance that stories and 
guesses that had no material basis 100 years ago have gained no validity in the 
intervening years, and suggests that in order to understand Dodgson's diaries-
which became public in their unexpurgated form in 1969 (except for pages that had 
been cut and presumably destroyed) and were published in 1993 - it is important to 
shed the presumptions of past guesswork. In other words, Leach, in her attempt to 
find "cohesion in the story ofhis [Carroll's] life" (196) does not assume that the 
portrait already drawn of Carroll - composed despite a lack of access to his papers 
- was necessarily founded in the life of Charles Dodgson. . 
Working from letters and diaries and Carroll's body ofwork, Leach's 
portrait of the man is very different from other biographies. She suggests that 
Carroll had a series ofboth active and untraditional (sexually speaking) 
relationships with many grown women, which probably began with a romantic 
relationship with Alice Liddell's mother, Lorina Liddell. This relationship, Leach 
c1aims, would give context and "cohesion" to what we know of his life at the time 
ofhis intimacy with the Liddells, his state ofmind and the highly sexualized (and 
guilt-ridden) poems he was writing at the time; a prime example ofwhich is "Stolen 
Waters" (Leach 195-196). She also suggests, that although he enjoyed the company 
of children (both boys and girls) his relationships with women were certainly at 
Il Taylor's complex work with Carroll's chess game and the word play in both the Alice books is 
juxtaposed with bis representation of Carroll's odd relationships with little girls. On page 196 of The 
White Knight he makes the statement that Carroll "carried ... toys and puzzles as bait' (myemphasis) 
to attract little girls he met on trains or at the beach. 
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least equally important and very adult; Leach quotes a letter to a female friend in 
which he states "Chi Id-society is very delightful to me: but 1 confess that grown-up 
society is much more interesting!" (228).12 Taking ail this into account, Leach's 
position is that Carroll himself, following a general public image, encouraged and 
possibly originated much of the Carrollian myth, as purity and chi Id love (pre-
Freud) was what Victorians preferred as the life of the author of the Alice books. In 
other words, Leach looks into the gaps in the publicly accepted story of the 
eccentric life of Lewis Carroll and uses that productive space to consider new ideas. 
Within the world ofCarrollian scholarship, not everyone agreed with her.13 ln fact, 
her text caused an uproar when it was published, an uproar which is arguably still 
roiling. 
It is not my intent to take on the opponents ofLeach's text, despite my 
opinion that any work 50 flrmly rooted in research, assessing both the work of the 
author and information that is now - somewhat newly - available to create a 
representation must be considered seriously. Rather, for the purposes ofthis 
chapter, 1 would like to assume that Leach is correct and that Lewis Carroll and 
Charles Dodgson parted company insofar as public identity is concerned. 
Accepting that assumption, the personae of Charles DodgsonILewis Carroll become 
two parts ofa triad of Author, Writer, and Text. This essay will investigate that 
12 1 find Leach's interpretation ofthis letter acceptable ifnot absolutely definitive. The letter is part of 
a correspondence between Carroll and the mother of a 13-year-old whom Carroll was inviting to one of 
his tête-à-tête dinners, ail of which raises the possibility of a manipulated presentation to the parent. 
Supporting Leach's interpretation, is the faet that the quote is from the finalletter in the 
correspondence (the dinner with the 13-year-old had already occurred) and is embedded in a dinner 
invitation to the mother. The invitation was accepted. (Carroll, Letters 1104) 
13 Donald Rackin, Professor Emeritus of English at Temple University calls Leach's suggestion of a 
love relationslùp with Lorina Liddell "sensational" (651). 1 find this an interesting response when 
juxtaposed to the claim that this supposed love relationship would he refuting - that of child love - and 
the post-Freudian implications thereof. 
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triad as it is represented within Alice 's Adventures in Wonder/and in an Hegelian 
search for recognition in which a loss of self for Alice opens a productive gap not 
unlike the gap within that dual identity of Lewis Carroll/Charles Dodgson. 
That identity and recognition is at issue in Alice 's Adventures in 
Wonder/and is quite clear. Alice poses the question of her identity and how very 
unrecognizable she is - even to herself - from the beginning and in a direct manner. 
ln the second chapter she considers this odd self she has become, wondering about 
several other children and whether or not she might have become one or the other 
ofthem: 
"Dear, dear! How queer everything is to-day! And yesterday things 
went onjust as usual, 1 wonder ifI've changed in the night? Let me 
think: was 1 the same when 1 got up this morning? 1 almost think 1 
can remember feeling a little different. But ifI'm not the same, the 
next question is 'Who in the world am I?'" And she began thinking of 
all the children she knew that were of the same age as herself, to see if 
she could have been changed for any ofthem. 
''l'm sure l'm not Ada" she said, "for her hair goes in long ringlets, 
and mine doesn't go in ringlets at all; and l'm sure 1 can't be Mabel, 
for 1 know all sorts of things, and she, oh, she knows such a very 
little!" (Carroll, Alice 1 0) 
Even for what would have to be considered an odd book, this is an odd response, 
and should be noted. In general, despite the most confusing of circumstances, the 
last thing we question are our own identities. As weB, in many ways Alice is quite 
sure of her identity: she is fairly sure that she is a little girl and knows that she 
owns a cat named Dinah; she knows that she is not Mary Anne, the White Rabbit's 
maid; she knows and states firmly a great many things, pointing out the March 
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Hare's incivility in offering wine when there is none to be had and the Hatter's 
rudeness in making personal remarks, so her nearly immediate assumption of a 
change ofidentity is noteworthy. In a Hegelian model of the three phases of 
recognition, this questioning of self is right on schedule, but while keeping this in 
mind, we should also note that Alice has been to sorne degree, the agent of her own 
change. 
Alice 's Adventures in Wonderland is presented as a dream and this 
presentation (as with Carlyle's fictional characters) allows for a great dea} of 
latitude in verisimilitude, yet it is still notable that Alice is both open-minded and 
intrepid when it cornes to her adventure. It is her following of the White Rabbit 
that originally takes her down under ground, and she willingly drinks and eats 
anything put in her way, at first out of curiosity, but later out of a definite intent to 
change her size in order to continue the adventure. "Oh dear! l'd nearly forgotten 
that l've got to grow up again! Let me see - how is it to be managed? 1 suppose 1 
ought to eat or drink something or other; but the great question is 'What?'" (Carroll, 
Alice 32) We can look at this willingness to shift size as attempt to regain a 
Lacanian identity, a "recognized place in the social order, by passing into the Law 
(the culture's signifying order)" (Leitch 2485); as the world she has entered clearly 
runs by different rules, perhaps Alice is attempting to "pass" into the "Law" of the 
land. We can also, and simultaneously, consider her shifting size along with her 
questioning of "who" she is - Mabel or Ada or "other" - as an example of the first 
phase of the Hegelian theory of recognition. 
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In what appears to be a very Hegelian moment, Alice bites into t~e little "eat 
me" cake and seems to veritably split apart as she grows so quickly that she loses 
sight of her feet, musing: 
[H]ow funny it'll seem, sending presents to one's own feet! And how 
odd the directions will look! 
Alice 's Right Foot, Esq. 
Hearthrog, 
near the Fender, 
(with Alice 's love). (Carroll, Alice 9) 
In Robert Williams' discussion of the Hegelian theory of recognition, "The 
Concept of Recognition in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit," he states that "[t]he 
other, or the confrontation with the other, both shatters the natural solipsism of the 
self and 'pulls' it out of its natural solipsism. The analysis of recognition therefore is 
also and at the same time a story of self-overcoming' (64). Working with Hegel's 
theory of recognition, Jessica Benjamin, in her text Shadow of the Other: 
Intersubjectivity and Gender in Psychoanalysis, states that "in the dialectic between 
recognition and negation the negating aspect is equally crucial" (xviii). Hegel makes 
the statement that self-consciousness "has come out of itself. .. tirst, it has lost itself, 
for it tinds itself as an other being" (sec. 179). In ail three ofthese quotations a form 
ofa gap or break is presented. Alice's break is clear in her questioning ofboth her 
identity and material completeness. With Wonderland playing the part of the "other," 
in her consideration of the possibility ofa changed identity and her consequent 
negation of self (the AdaIMabel cum division from physical self question), she 
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attempts to recognize both Wonderland and herself within it. The fluidity with which 
she considers her identity and the changes which she quite willingly agents (with the 
help of cakes and bottles oftasty liquids) are enaeted in an attempt to complete this 
act of recognition. 
Hegel states in Phenomenology of Spirit that the "[ s ]elf-conscious exists in 
and for itself when, and by the faet that it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in 
being acknowledged" (sec. 178). For Hegel recognition is a process ofthree phases: 
initial confrontation with the other, creating an abrupt self-transcendence and 
consequent loss of self; followed by an attempt at eliminating or diminishing the 
other in an effort to regain that self; the final phase is that of mutual absolution 
(Williams 67). From her first entrance into Wonderland, Alice searéhes for both the 
recognizable and recognition. Her desire to enter the beautiful garden seen through 
the tiny door is because that garden is recognizable as a place ofbeauty and safety.14 
It is her wish to gain access to the garden that motivates her actions for a large portion 
of the tint half of the book, Ufging her on as she drinks and eats, but it is her wish for 
recognition that creates mu ch ofher interaction with the inhabitants ofthis odd world. 
After her initialloss of self in the hallway, in which she questions her 
destabilized identity and finds herselfphysically changing, she meets a series of 
charaeters who do not recognize her. Rather, most of the inhabitants ofWonderland 
treat her as an object, and although Alice recognizes the forms ofthese creatures-
mou se, bird, fish - she does not recognize them fully in their changed and 
14 In the end, the garden is not what Alice expects, and it may he that this final disillusiorunent 
produces Alice's rejection ofWonderland Amy Billone notes in her essay "The Boy Who Lived: 
From Carroll' s Alice and Barrie's Peter Pan to Rowling's Harry Potter" that "the lovely Edenic garden 
that she glimpses after she tumbles down the rabbit hole turns out to he an illusion. Her resulting rage, 
which augments throughout the book, causes her physically to grow out of her nightmare" (179). 
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anthropomorphized fonns. Consequently she makes endless mistakes. Finding 
herself swimming beside a mou se, she chatters on about her cat Dinah in an effort to 
make contact, not recognizing that for the "other" the se references to Dinah elide any 
ability for the creature to recognize Alice as anything except a threat. Because she is 
a threat, she is constantly being negated and resignified by the inhabitants who often 
have no interest in the pro cess of recognition. For the most part these characters seem 
to exist within a state of "pre-ethical desire" in which the "pattem[s] of desire 
predominate" (Williams 66). Consider her discussion with the pigeon: 
"U gh, Serpent!" 
"But l'm not a serpent, 1 tell you!" said Alice. ''l'm a - l'm a-" 
"Weil! What are you?" said the Pigeon. "1 can see you're trying to 
invent something!" 
"1 - l'm a little girl," said Alice, rather doubtfully, as she remembered 
the number of changes she gone through that day. 
"A likely story indeed" said the Pigeon, in atone of the deepest 
contempt. ''l've seen a good many little girls in my time, but never 
one with such a neck as that! No, no! You're a serpent; and there's no 
use denying it. 1 suppose you'lI be telling me that you never tasted an 
egg!" 
"1 have tasted eggs, certainly," said Alice, who was a very truthful 
child; "but little girls eat eggs quite as much as serpents do, you 
know." 
"1 don't believe it," said the Pigeon; "but ifthey do, then they're a 
kind of serpent: that's aIl 1 can say." (Carroll, Alice 41) 
Here, in one feH swoop, the Pigeon refuses recognition and, in a rather impressive 
denial of the Carte sian concept of the duaIity ofmind and body (Leitch 1285), 
resignifies Alice according to her appearance and actions. The Pigeon accepts the 
infonnation before her only as it is relevant within her "pre-ethical desire" to keep her 
eggs safe, thus refusing to allow any gap in her essentialist understanding of the 
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world. If Alice has a serpent-like neck and eats eggs, then Alice is a kind of serpent. 
1 
Recognition is refuted; Alice is an object rather than a subject and must take the form 
thaJ is relevant to the observer. Just as she is the maid servant, Mary Anne, to the 
[ 
White Rabbit to the Pigeon, Alice is a serpent. This refusal of recognition is played 
out:over and over again throughout Wonderland, creating a destabilization of Alice's 
identity - a gap - within which she questions that identity, inviting us to question it 
1 . 
1 
with her. But as to Hegel's second phase of recognition, it is the workings of the 
1 
1 
1 
court and the royal couple that we must observe. 
The Queen ofHearts is a character caught in a permanent spiral that lies 
1 
within the second phase of recognition. In her essay, '" Ali Sorts ofPitfalls and 
Surprises': Competing Views ofIdealized Girlhood in Lewis Carroll's Alice Books," 
Jenpifer Geer characterizes the Queen as "childish and despotic" (9). This is a 
1 
depiction that 1 would certainly agree with, but it is important to remember that even 
1 
1 
a spoiled child is seeking to fulfill a need. The Queen is seeking a position from 
1 
1 
which to be recognized and (like the child playing king-of-the-hill) in order to gain 
the:style of recognition that she craves she diminishes the subjectivity ofthose around 
her~by ordering executions. Here we should note that those executions are never 
1 
ap~arently followed through; either those ordered executed are hidden, or the King 
1 
follows behind pardoning ail and sundry. It is the "Master and Slave" dialogue in the 
flesh. 
As the Queen herself never verifies that the executions are carried out, it 
[ 
see~s quite clear that she does not reall y desire anyone' s death. If she actuall y 
ach;ieved even a portion of the executions that she orders she would quickly run out of 
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people to execute and, then too, who would recognize her as their Queen? As 
1 
Williams defines Hegel's second phase: "[t]he struggle is not simply directed toward 
1 
the elimination of the other; it is over recognition and relation. The allegedly 
1 
'absolute self needs the other to recognize and confirm it. That is why the death of 
the lopponent would be self-defeating" (67-68) So although it is important to the 
QuJen that she be able to order executions those orders are merely a display ofher 
1 
po~ers; a display that reifies the master/slave relationship and the recognition of her 
position. 
1 
Hegel felt that this relationship was ultimately unfulfilling: 
1 
[T]he unessential consciousness is for the lord the object, which 
constitutes the truth of his certainty of himself. But it is clear that this 
object do es not correspond to its Notion, but rather that the object in 
which the lord has achieved his lordship has in reality tumed out to be 
something quite different from an independent consciousness. What 
now really confronts him is not an independent consciousness, but a 
dependent one. He is, therefore, not certain of being-for-itself as the 
truth ofhimself. On the contrary, his truth is in reality the unessential 
consciousness and its unessential action. (Hegel sec. 192) 
Although 1 find this construction of the Master/Slave relationship compelling, it does 
1 
notlinform our conclusion about the Queen ofHeart's level of fulfi II me nt. Rather, 
1 
although seriously cranky, she appears content with the limited intercourse between 
1 
herself and her slave/subjects, as well as her "unes senti al action." But "unessential 
1 
action" is the norm for many of the inhabitants ofWonderland. 15 For these 
, 
inhabitants there is no gap, no schism in identity, rather they reify their nonsensical 
1 
15 T;he Mad Hatter' s tea party is an example of "unessential action." Nothing is achieved or 
concluded, rather, because of an argument between the Hatter and Time, the three participants are 
caugItt in a pennanent - and accepted - round of dirty dishes and unanswerable riddles. 
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world and thus open gaps for Alice, who is striving to recognize rather than reify, by 
1 
1 
insisting that she re-evaluate the most basic of questions (are babies the same as 
1 
pigs?). AlI ofthis leaves us to conclu de that most ofWonderland requires only a 
1 
modicum of recognition similarly to the way in which the Dormouse's murmurs that 
i 
he Îs awake largely satisfy his companions. Perhaps it is this refusaI of recognition 
tha~ informs the Cheshire-Cat's characterization of ail inhabitants ofWonderland as 
, 
"m~d" (Carroll, Alice 50). Regardless ofthis solipsistic response of the majority of 
inh~bitants, it is not true of absolutely aIl the characters. Let us move on to the next 
phase of Alice's search, which is achieved by Alice and two ofthose inhabitants. 
1 
1 Only very occasionally does Alice find sorne being with whom she manages a 
codversation in which she seems to have sorne effect. Two notable instances are the 
Caterpillar and the Cheshire-Cat, who se characterization of his co-inhabitants is so 
, 
apt, and even these conversations are frustrating. The Caterpillar is the first character 
1 
1 
in Wonderland who actually asks Alice to identify herself. That she is a subject 
1 
rather than an object is made clear in the passage 1 quoted at the start ofthis chapter. 
She not only has an identity, but the Caterpillar wishes to recognize her, and despite 
the Iless than cozy tone of the conversation, information is offered and accepted as the 
Ca~erpillar considers Alice' s problems: 
1 
"So you think you 're changed, do you?" said the Caterpillar. 
'Tm afraid 1 am, Sir," said Alice. "1 can't remember things as 1 used 
- and 1 don't keep the same size for ten minutes together!" 
"Can't remember.what things?" said the Caterpillar. 
"WeIl, l've tried to say 'How doth the little busy bee,' but it aIl came 
different!" Alice replied in a very melancholy voice. 
"Repeat 'fou are old, Father William,'" said the Caterpillar. (Carroll, 
Alice 35) 
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It is clear that the Caterpillar both sees Alice as a subject and - in a laconic 
, 
maAner - attempts to discover her problems. Then, having defined at least one those 
pro~lems, he off ers her the solution to controlling her changing size by indicating the 
uses ofhis mushroom. When eaten, one side of the mushroom causes her to grow, 
1 
the ,other to shrink; with this information Alice takes more control and thus increases 
1 
1 
her agency over her size within Wonderland. So by handing Alice agency and 
con~rol, the Caterpillar treats Alice as a subject and moves offto live his own life. It 
is ah example of the third phase ofHegelian recognition: mutual absolution. 
Another inhabitant in Wonderland with whom Alice has a third phase 
relationship is the Cheshire-Cat and it is with the Cheshire-Cat that Alice most clearly 
1 
achieves, not only the absolution of the third phase of recognition, but sorne sort of 
aclrd. In Hegel's words, "[t]hey recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one 
another" (sec. 184). In her response to Jessica Benjamin's work Shadow of the Other, 
Butler too defines recognition as moving past absolution: 
1 
1 
It [recognition] is, rather, a process that is engaged when subject and 
Other understand themselves to be reflected in one another, but where 
this reflection does not result in a collapse of the one into the Other 
(through an incorporative identification, for instance) or a projection 
that annihilates the alterity of the Other. .. Recognition implies that we 
see the Other as separate, but as structured psychically in ways that are 
shared. (Butler, Undoing Gender 132) 
This process is reflected in the relationship between Alice and the Cheshire 
Cat, although it begins with sorne reserve on Alice's part - "it had very long claws 
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and 1 a great many teeth, so she felt that it ought to be treated with respect" (Carroll, 
Ali~e 49) - the conversation moves into the realm of an interchange of information 
1 . 
and, ideas quickly: 
1 
"By-the-by, what became of the baby?" said the Cat. "rd nearly 
forgotten to ask." 
"It tumed into a pig," Alice answered very quietly, just as if the Cat 
had come back in a natural way. 
"1 thought it would," said the Cat, and vanished again. 
* * * 
"Did you say 'pig' or 'fig'?" said the Cat. 
"1 said 'pig," replied Alice; "and 1 wish you wouldn't keep appearing 
and vanishing so suddenly: you make one quite giddy!" 
"AlI right," said the Cat; and this time it vanished quite slowly, 
beginning with the end of the tail, and ending with the grill, which 
remained sorne time after the rest of it had gone. (Carroll, Alice 51) 
Here, not only do Alice and the Cat have a discussion in which information is sought 
1 
1 
and received, but as weIl, a favor is asked and granted. This is a far cry from most of 
the 1 interaction Alice has had previously in Wonderland; compared to the Hatter and 
1 
theiMarch Rare who ask riddles with no answers, who contradict and insult Alice, the 
1 
Cheshire-Cat is positively cooperative. On Alice's part, she has found the space to 
1 
accept an unusual form ofbehavior (disappearance) more readily. 
1 
At their next meeting they greet one another as old friends: "she said to 
her~elf 'Ifs the Cheshire-Cat: now 1 shaH have somebody to talk to.' 'How are you 
getring on?' said the Cat, as soon as there was mouth enough to speak with" (Carroll, 
1 
Alice 68). In the same scene, Alice defends the Cat to the King after the Cat declines 
1 
to kiss the royal hand. The tone of their conversation, the interest they show in one 
1 
another, and Alice' s defense aIl seem to speak of a camaraderie that simply does not 
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exist for Alice with anyone else in Wonderland. Consequently, it is important that the 
1 
Cheshire-Cat does not appear in Alice's final scene within that dream-space, for it is 
1 
in that final scene that she gives up aIl attempts at recognition. 
After the Cheshire-Cat fades away to the frustration of the King, who has 
taken the Cat as a serious threat,16 and the court is convened in order to try the Knave 
1 
ofHearts for stealing those very famous tarts, Alice finds herself in the midst of yet 
! 
ano,ther transformation. She is growing (without intending to), and as she grows, her 
1 
1 
patience wanes. She comments that the jurors are "stupid things" (Carroll, Alice 90) 
1 
and' although she apologizes for upsetting the jury box (due to her large size), she 
notes that it does not "signifly] much" whether Bill the lizard is upside down or right 
1 
side up as "he would be quite as much use in the trial one way up as the other" 
1 
, 
(Carroll, Alice 96). Size matters, or, as Geer notes, "[i]n Wonderland, power rests not 
1 
1 
wit~ the mIe of law as in the ideal public realm, nor with the affections and 
1 
conscience as in the ideal domestic realm, but with the individual who can dominate 
1 
1 
others most successfully" (9-10). So, as her size increases and she is able to 
dor~ünate, Alice becomes quite assertive in her disparagement of the entire 
proceedings: 
1 
' Ifany one ofthem can explain it,' said Alice (she had grown so large 
in the last few minutes that she wasn 't a bit afraid of interrupting him 
[the King]), 'l'Il give him sixpence. 1 don't believe there's an atom of 
meaning in it.' (Carroll, Alice 100) 
16 The Cat is the only creature that the King actually tries to execute, which, considering their 
solidanty, calls into question Atice's safety as well. 
, 
47 
As 1 mentioned earlier, Amy Billone conflates Alice' s size with her frustration 
(179, 185), which tallies with the court scene in which Alice's steady growth occurs 
in sync with her scathing and unafraid protest over "having the sentence first" 
, 
(Cakoll, Alice 102) and her response to the Queen's order for her execution. With 
i 
, 
that order, ail attempts on Alice's side to "recognize" the inhabitants ofWonderland 
end i '''Who cares for you?' said Alice (she had grown to her full size by this time). 
'Yqu 're nothing but a pack of cards! '" (Carroll, Alice 1 02). Here Alice negates any 
1 
1 
recognition of an "other," relegates the inhabitants of Wonderland to objects (cards) 
1 
and forecloses those productive gaps that have allowed her to view the world so 
, 
1 
differently. With those words, she wakes to find herself in the very familiar lap of her 
• 1 17 slst~r. 
So how, in aIl ofthis, does Karoline Leach's conception of Lewis Carroll's 
dual identity play out? It is quite possible, even likely considering Dodgson's 
1 
interests, that Lewis Carroll/Charles Dodgson had read Hegel, especially considering 
1 
Rosemary Ashton's note that "the upsurge ofHegelianism in England ... happened 
1 
pre~ominantly in Oxford" in the mid 1860s (211 063), approximately the same time 
that Alice was being written. So, it could certainly be true that Carroll was playing 
witp Hegel's idea of recognition when composing Alice 's Adventures in Wonder/and. 
1 
What is definitely clear, is that Carroll was playing with the idea of dual identity if 
1 
only in choosing a penname for this particular text (he had previously published texts 
on bathematics under the name ofDodgson), although this choice may possibly have 
1 
17 IlwOuld like to note that this fInal scene is "unrecognizable" within the context of Carroll 's tale. 
Alice's sister's waking dream of Alice as a mother who bas retained a child's "loving heart" (Carroll 
104) is irreconcilable with the behavior Alice displays throughout her interactions in Wonderland. 
Geer notes: "[f]rom a logical perspective, this final scene is as nonsensical as anything in 
Wonderland" (1). 
1 
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been made in an effort to protect his privacy or reputation as a scholar. What is not 
1 
possible is that he was playing sorne the kind of personal game having to do with the 
1 
1 
fam'e that Leach speaks of, because it was Alice that catapulted Carroll into the public 
eye! However, Carroll' s presentation of Al ice' s sense of self gives us is an 
1 
understanding of how his mind worked when it came to the concepts surrounding 
ide?tity and recognition. Let us consider another piece of Carroll' s work which faIls 
out~ide the realm of objectlsubject recognition, but in another way has a great deal to 
1 
1 
do ~th the space between accepted and perceived meanings. In the following 
1 
excerpt trom Carroll' s poem "Jabberwocky" it is the identity of the words that is in 
i . question. 
And hast thou slain the Jabberwock? 
Come to my arrns, my beamish boy! 
Oh trabjous day! Callooh! Callay!" 
He chortled in his joy. 
(Carroll, Alice 124) 
Orthe 22 words in this stanza six had no meaning (no identity) when the poem was 
wri~en (including the word "chortled" which slipped trom Carroll' s poem into 
standard language), and yet, there seems little question as to the taie that Carroll is 
1 
telling. In an act that could be considered one of faith in human beings' ability to 
1 
"recognize" one another on even a destabilized linguistic plane, Carroll wrote an 
, 
exJiting and accessible piece of poetry using words that had no inherent signification. 
1 
Th~s is the act of a man who understands what it is to recognize the "other" and 
exliibits great faith in the "other' s" ability to retum that recOgnition; it is also the act 
1 
49 
of a man who likes to play games with that recognition; and, finally, it is the work of 
soJeone who understands just how productive the space between two "knowns" that 
1 
are hot contiguous can be. In a similar manner Carroll uses the multiple meanings of 
i 
words in the Dormouse's story of the three sisters: 
! 
[ Alice] tumed to the Dormouse and repeated her question. "Why did 
they [the three sisters] live at the bottom ofa weil?" 
The Dormouse again took a minute to think about it, and then said "It 
was a treacle-well." 
* * * 
"And so these three little sisters - they were leaming to draw you 
know -" 
"What did they draw?" said Alice, quite forgetting her promise. 
"Treacle," said the Dormouse, without considering at ail, this time. 
* * * 
"But 1 don't understand. Where did they draw the treacle from?" 
"You can draw water out of a water-well," said the Hatter, "so 1 
should think you could draw treacle out of a treacle-well - eh, stupid?" 
"But they were in the weil," Alice said to the Dormouse, not choosing 
to notice this last remark. . 
"Of course they were," said the Dormouse: "weil in." (Carroll, Alice 
59) 
Listening to the Dormouse (or any number of other inhabitants from Wonderland) the 
shifts between meanings of the words that the characters use to tell their stories or 
1 
1 
express their thoughts literally give the reader pause and consequently create gaps in 
our receptive process. We must stop and reconsider in an attempt to recognize the 
sig~ification of something that we thought we understood just moments before, just 
as .Nice must stop and reconsider who she is in her attempts at self-definition and 
1 
recpgnition. It is the sliding shifts, the slippage of meaning, the gaps that allow and 
1 
50 
require new questions or new consideration of old questions. Like the cut pages in 
, 
Charles Dodgson's diaries, the gaps left by those shifting significations insist that we 
1 
1 
con,sider alternatives to accepted norms. 
1 
For the Victorians those gaps and shifts figured large. The Victorian public, a 
1 
public which Antony Harrison describes as "destabilized by the vertiginous effects of 
, 
ind~strialism and the new science" (27), embraced, what Morton Cohen quotes a 
rev~ewer as calling, the "delicious nonsense" (xvi) ofCarroll's story. But perhaps 
wh~t the Victorians were also embracing was a reflection of the fluidity and, what 
must have seemed, nearly alchemical changes within their frightening and exciting 
1 
era.' Perhaps it was those gaps, that Carroll so playfully presents, that resonated with 
! 
the iVictorians. As the structural ground oftheir daily existence shifted, life sped up 
andl processes changed, gaps were created that allowed and insisted that moral s, 
1 
1 
religious beliefs, human rights and governmental structures all shift too. 
, 
1 
If Lewis Carroll was not purposeJy playing with his own fame, at least not in 
the writing of Alice 's Adventures in Wonder/and, does it not appear likely that the 
mind that composed "Jabberwocky," constructed the Dormouse's story and renamed 
hi"iselfwould find agame involving shifting scenes, changing meaning and fluid 
identity interesting and amusing? Is there not space within what we know of aIl three 
1 
of the portions ofthat triad ofWriter/AuthorlText to allow for new ideas like, among 
1 
pot~ntially others, Karoline Leach's? As with Butler's displacement between 
, 
ana~omy and performance, it is that productive space that occurs when the known "is" 
do~s not correspond to sorne other known "is" - or for that matter "is not" - that 
allows for change: of ideas, of procedures, of perceptions. Carroll ' s shifts of meaning 
, 
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andi perception bring to mind the gaps and rapid changes that define the Victorians 
and the age within which they lived. 
1 
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Chapter Three 
Who Goes There: Hegelian Recognition in Middlemarch 
1 
Perhaps you will say, "Do improve the facts a little, then; make them 
more accordant with those correct views which it is our privilege to 
possess. The world is not just what we like; do touch it up with a 
tasteful pencil, and make believe it is not quite such a mixed entangled 
affair. Let ail people who hold unexceptionable opinions act 
unexceptionably. Let your most faulty characters always be on the 
wrong side, and your virtuous ones on the right. Then we shall see at a 
glance whom we are to condemn, and whom we are to approve. Then 
we shall be able to admire, without the slightest disturbance of our 
prepossessions: we shaH hate and despise with that true ruminant 
relish which belongs to undoubting confidence." 
But, my good friend, what will you do then with your fellow-
parishioner who opposes your husband in the vestry? - with your 
newly-appointed vicar, whose style ofpreaching you find painfully 
below that ofhis regretted predecessor? - with the honest servant who 
worries your soul with her one failing? - with your neighbor, Mrs. 
Green, who was really kind to you in your last illness, but has said 
several ill-natured things about you since your convalescence? - nay, 
with your excellent husband himself, who has other irritating habits 
besides that of not wiping his shoes? These fellow-mortals every one, 
must be accepted as they are: you can neither straighten their noses, 
nor brighten their wit, nor rectify their dispositions; and it is the se 
people - amoungst whom your life is passed - that it is needful you 
should tolerate, pit y, and love: it is these more or less ugly, stupid, 
inconsistent people, whose movements of goodness you should be able 
to admire - for whom you should cherish ail possible hopes, ail 
possible patience. And 1 would not, even if 1 had the choice, be the 
clever novelist who could create a world so much better than this, in 
which we get up in the moming to do our daily work, that you would 
be likely to tum a harder, colder eye on the dusty streets and the 
common green fields - on the real breathing men and women, who can 
be chilled by your indifference or injured by you prejudice; who can 
be cheered and helped onward by you fellow-feeling, your 
forbearance, your out-spoken, brave justice. (Eliot, Adam Bede 176) 
The above passage trom Adam Bede introduces a wide range of concepts trom 
compassion to duty, trom the inconsistency ofhuman nature to the nobility that 
1 
inconsistency can encompass. The excerpt is both clever and endearing, however, 
1 
1 
after our initial reaction it is important to note that, underlying ail her comments 
1 
1 
about how and why humans behave and respond to one another in the ways they do, 
1 
1 
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lies' George Eliot' s foundational statement about recognition. From the wish for a 
1 
consistent and simplistic (i.e. easily recognizable) form ofbehavior projected by the 
1 
elegantly manipulated words of Eliot onto her constructed observers in the first 
1 h h . . th . . h d Id' . . paragrap ,to er sUppOSitIOn at It IS necessary to compre en our wor as It IS 10 
ordbr to best appreciate it, this extract posits the ability to recognize that which 
constructs our daily lives and relationships as a foundational skill set necessary to 
1 
successfully make one's way through life. It is through this conception of recognition 
1 
as riecessary to productive decision making, as well as the construction of fiuitful 
1 . 
personal and community relationships that 1 wish to approach the final text 1 will be 
1 
1 
dealing with in my thesis, George Eliot' s Middlemarch. 
As the above excerpt makes abundantly clear, Eliot holds the need to both 
recognize and represent that which she perceives in the world as accurately as 
1 
1 
possible regardless of conflicting interests as the ultimate duty of a writer of prose 
1 
1 
1 
fiction. In fact, ifwe consider the gaps between her publicly held views on morality 
1 
1 
1 
and the manner in which her fiction often fails to support those views (as 1 will 
discuss later in this chapter) we can see that this adherence to recognition and faithful 
reptesentation of that which has been recognized is a precept that she privileges 
1 
1 
abOie personal ideology and that ideology's dissemination. Add to that ethic Eliot's 
mimetic style in which she has none of the freedoms that both Carlyle and Carroll 
1 
1 
allowed themselves by employing myth and fantasy as the choice of genre, and we 
finrl that recognition becomes the foundational block in Eliot's fiction - the success 
of~hich dictates the level ofher accomplishment and the longevity ofher stories. So 
1 
in this final chapter, it is Eliot's textMiddlemarch and its position within the context 
1 
1 
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of my discourse involving Victorian spaces with which 1 will move forward the idea 
1 
of recognition that 1 introduced in my consideration ofCarlyle's mis-recognition of 
1 
his own performative effect and continued with Lewis Carroll' s experiments in the 
AliJe stories, as weIl as in his public persona. In the case of Middlemarch, 1 would 
lik~ to broaden that spectrum to take in as weIl the attendant complications of a 
failure to recognize and retain important information. Using the work of Hegel in 
1 
wh~ch (as 1 discuss in Chapter 2) attainment of the third stage of recognition is 
1 
dependent on a recognition of not only the "other" but as well the information 
1 
1 
gleaned from interaction with that "other," a consideration ofEliot's relationship to 
FeJerbach's theology in which the human soul and God are conflated in mélange of 
hol~ness and humanity, and Butler's conception ofdesire as both a motivation and 
guide, 1 will be considering just how recognition of self and community (personal and 
1 
universal) construct the novel, driving forward the plot and power the ideas. 
1 
1 
ln her essay "Philosophy in the Bedroom: Middlemarch and the ScandaI of 
1 
Syrhpathy," Hina Nazar states that "Middlemarch is often described as a novel about 
kndwledge ... a novel about marri age and interpersonal relations" (295), and although 
1 understand and accept the ideas underlying tbis classification,18 1 would argue that 
1 • 
Eli0t's most highly acclaimed, epic work is as well- ifnot primarily - a novel that is, 
1 
on both the macro and micro level of construction, deeply concerned with 
i 
recognition, mis-recognition and the manner in which cataclysmic alterations occur 
1 
within the gap between the two. ln Middlemarch, as in both Sartor Resartus and 
AUbe 's Adventures in Wonderland, it is the space that lies between two positions that 
18 As Nazar notes, Dorothea's quest for knowledge that leads her to marry Casaubon often suggests 
this1classification of the novel (295), certainly a valid representation ifnot particularly central to my 
own thesis. 
1 
1 
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1 wbuld like to address, but it is important to note the different properties of the space 
of~hich 1 speak. For Carlyle the space lay between the intended and the material 
effect of rus writing and for Carroll between his private and public personas as weIl as 
1 . 
in the pause in communication created by sudden shifts in meaning within his texts; 
1 
Eliot most c10sely resembles Carlyle in that communication is never to be taken 
ligJtly despite its playfulness. Although she is often playful in a satiric manner (as 
exa~pled in the first paragraph of the excerpt from Adam Bede), she attempts at aIl 
times to make direct contact with her reader through recognizable representations, 
1 
while presenting that reader with illustrations ofhow unreliable contact between 
1 
human beings can be, i.e. mis-recognition, and as weIl, how catastrophic a 
miscarriage ofthat connection often is. For if the productive gap that lies between 
rec9gnition and mis-recognition is a space in which much can be amended (as with 
Freâ Vincy and his attempts and final success to recognize his position in society), it 
1 
is as weIl, a space where much can be lost (as with Lydgate and the consequences of 
1 
1 
his mis-recognition ofRosamond). Perhaps most importantly, it is that space that 
dicJates for aIl three authors the effective creation of representations by which they 
1 
understood themselves and the Victorian public, thus influencing both the public and 
per~onal self recognition of Victorians. That George Eliot was influential in the 
formation of the Victorian conception of self as represented in literature is unarguable 
1 
(Mermin 138-139), but to begin considering the function of recognition in her work 
1 
1 
and specifically in Middlemarch, as with Carroll, 1 would like to start with Eliot's 
con~tructions surrounding concepts of recognition ofher public and private personae 
bef6re moving on to how those concepts function within her works of fiction. 
1 
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As a writer who began her career in the late 1860s as she was nearing the age 
of fort y, Eliot had lived through many of the vicissitudes ofpolitical reform and the 
rise of industrialization that epitomized the Victorian era and, consequently, 
l ' 
possessed a finely detailed conception ofwho the public surrounding her was, what 
1 
, 
had, gone into creating that public and an ideology suggesting who they might and 
1 
(lik~ Carlyle) should become. She possessed as weIl a personal understanding of the 
1 
gap or space necessary for achievement or change - what she called for herself 
"'room' into which she c[ould] 'expand'" (Hertz 25). The words "room to expand" 
within the context of nineteenth-century England with its investment in colonization 
1 
1 
automatically brings to mind the co-option of space or possessions that belong to 
1 
sorne "other," but Eliot's own need for space dealt with an incorporation ofa more 
1 
1 
Lacanian Other, a need we can discover in her various name changes. 
Eliot began to contemplate her first name change at the age of 14 when she 
wrote on her notebook "Marianne Evans" instead of the name she had been given-
1 
Mary Anne Evans (Hertz 25); this change is an important choice and 1 will return to 
1 
it, ~ut for the moment it is the second name change that 1 wish to address. Marian 
1 
1 
Evans' second change of designation19 was the more public name adjustment that she 
1 
took on as a writer - George Eliot. As 1 stated in my chapter on Lewis Carroll, there 
are ~practical reasons for a writer to choose a penname. For Carroll, it appears that he 
wished to delineate between his mathematical (serious) writing and his fantasy 
1 
writing for children; that bid for serious consideration was likely one ofEliot's 
1 
mo~ivations as weIl. Although there were many female writers being published 
1 
1 
19 Different biographers have chosen different spellings for George Eliot's private name: Hertz uses 
Marian; McSweeney, Mary Ann. As Marian is the preferred choice of narne by the novelist herself, 1 
will ibe using that spelling when referring to her by her private name. 
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throughout the century20 and sorne were weil respected (Eliot's own position as "sage 
1 
writer" is indicative ofhow high female writers could rise), there was a readiness to 
1 
dismiss the work ofwomen.21 Eliot was aware of the bias and, in a discussion of her 
1 
use of a male pseudonym under which she published articles in the Westminster 
ReJiew, makes the statement (McSweeney, George 81): "The article appears to have 
protluced a strong impression, and that impression would be li little counteracted if 
1 
the iauthor were known to be a woman" (Eliot, Letters II, 218). Then too, considering 
Eliot's less than socially acceptable cohabitation with Lewes (a married man) that 
l ' 
1 
was established before she began her fiction career, there was no question that 
an06ymity was the prudent move at least until sorne reputation had been established; 
in dther words, sorne form of recognition for Eliot's work needed to be accrued 
bef<:>re it would have been wise to allow the reading public to know that the author 
was living a life many found unacceptable. And there it is; Eliot was seeking 
1 
rerognition (in the sense of a "formai acknowledgement as conveys approval or 
sanbtion ofsomething" [OED definition 4.a.]) for her work without the potentially 
tain~ing influence of her personallife. Here, it is worth noting that Eliot' s assuming 
oft~e name Mrs. Lewes implies that she desired recognition (sanction) for a state of 
, 
mat,rimony that she did not, technically speaking, possess, as it could be argued that 
1 
this discontinuity informs the formation ofDorothea's character. However, l'Il return 
1 
1 
to that idea later. Meanwhile, what becomes clear is that her choice ofusing a 
2() RIchard Altick notes that "of the 878 novelists listed in John Sutherland's Stanford Companion to 
Victorian Fiction, 312 were wornen" (298). 
21 Eliot's own essay "Silly Novels by Lady Novelist" is indicative ofthis trend that she herselfwished 
to ~pe and that was to end in the extremity of the rnodernist (and largely male) backlash that created 
what were often exc1usionary definitions ofwork that could he considered "literature" and what could 
not (Arata 61). 
1 
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penname is both logical and prudent, and with that said, let us revisit the earlier name 
chahge for there is another kind of recognition, less based in logic, that is inherent 
i 
within that more personal adjustment. 
It is certainly a very normal childhood activity, to inscribe a prettier, more 
adv1enturous, or more exotic form of name, and certainly many a fourteen-year-old 
has,played injust this way. If Mary Anne Evans had been experimenting with her 
1 
surname, we might be tempted to impose a traditional assumption of an interest in 
1 . 
marriage and the identity change that becoming a wife implies, but playing with a 
first name suggests a more immediate and personal question of identity and 
pot€mtially a wish to take control of how one is regarded. Once again, Butler' s theory 
1 
of drag performance and Sarah Salih' s interpretation of that theory prove useful in 
1 
support of my argument. If, as Butler posits, gender is performatively produced, then 
1 
the:name bestowed on a child at birth is certainly a portion ofthat production. 
1 
Although names do not absolutely imply a gender signification, in many if not most 
cases they do, but, moving beyond gender, it appears clear that in conferring a name 
upon a child a parent is both legally and, if possible, materially attempting to produce 
1 
(impose?) an identity for his/her child. In changing that name, the child both 
syJbolically and materially recaptures sorne measure of agency over that identity. 
On~ can consider this process as Lacan's Other taking a more privileged position that 
allows for a greater scope, i.e. a persona to grow into; or perhaps it is a form of 
Sal~h's description ofButler's drag performance as an altering of the "clothes" that 
are!one's (gender or other) identity. In Eliot's case in the shift between the plain 
ver:sion of her name, Mary Anne, to the lacier form, Marianne, we can clearly see 
60 
Salih's idea of the sewing on of "sequins" (50) in order to create a grander identity. 
But! whichever theory we espouse, this grasping of a control over the name by which 
we are identified is a methodology used to change the boundaries of character that are 
imposed (probably necessarily) during childhood. It is as weil a creation of a gap, 
1 
and it was within that gap - between Mary Anne and Marian, between Marian Evans 
1 
and George Eliot, between the identity that was already defined and one that was 
1 
1 
mo~e amorphous and allowed for differences - that the space for self realization 
1 
occ~rred. 
If Maggie Tulliver is an autobiographical portrait, as is suggested by 
nUl11erous critics including McSweeney (George 88) and Hertz (42) and considering 
theilimited freedoms allowed the protagonist of The Mill on the Floss, then a space 
pri~d away from the predetermined identity of a dictatorial family may have been 
necessary to allow for Marian Evans to create and George Eliot to publish. By 
creating that space or gap, these two personae become two sections of a whole 
1 
1 
m~hanism that allowed the writer/author to become recognized as a successful 
pro'ducer of literature. And it is clear that recognition was important to Eliot when we 
co~sider the way in which recognition or failure to recognize function within the text. 
1 
To understand that importance we must return to the very basics ofhow recognition 
1 
functions in fiction. 
~ How do we "recognize" fictional characters in mimetic fiction? It sounds like 
an bbvious question as, for realism to be considered weil written, the characters must 
be recognizable. But in Catherine Gallagher' s essay "George Eliot: Immanent 
Victorian" she makes the interesting point that fiction is an inversion of our "normal 
1 
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empirical ways ofthinking about the relation between the real and the imaginary, the 
sensual or experiential," stating that, in fiction "the type is the presumed referent 
1 
whi,le individuals are presumed to be tictional" (62). Suggesting a construction in 
1 
which "type," rather than being a methodology by which to organize the actions and 
thoughts of individuals as it is in life, functions in a directly opposite manner -
1 
, ind~viduals are constructed from and recognized by type. In other words, our 
1 
recbgnition of individuals is dependent on those individuals behaving within a 
recognized and accepted set of actions belonging to a type. Gallagher goes on to note 
that Eliot is both fully aware ofthis inversion and exploits it. Considering Eliot's 
knJwledge of Feuerbach, it seems likely a reflection ofhis comment that "[i]n life we 
are !concemed with individuals, but in science, with species" (98), and thus the 
science ofwriting begins with the species/type, only then moving on to the 
individuals that evolve out of the type. Gallagher's choice of excerpt in order to 
1 
illustrate this point falls on Eliot's representation ofMr. Brooke as a conglomeration 
1 
of"types" (63). 
1 
J 
Mr. Brooke's conclusions were as difficult to predict as the weather: it 
was safe to say that he would act with benevolent intentions and that 
he would spend as little money as possible in carrying them out. For 
the most glutinously indefinite minds enclose sorne hard grains of 
habit; and a man has been seen lax about all his own interests except 
the retention of his snuflbox, concerning which he was watchful, 
suspicious, and greedy of clutch. (Eliot, Middlemarch 6) 
Recognition ofMr. Brooke depends on Eliot's comparison ofhim to several 
J 
1 
conflicting types, with the "snuflbox clutcher" type (Gallagher 63) winning the day as 
62 
is ~ade dear by Brooke's consistent choice to spend as litt le as possible. But it is 
Eliot's insistence that we compare Mr. Brooke not only to a single "type" ofperson 
1 
we have had dealings with, but in fact several "types" of people we might know that 
1 
1 
bin~s us to him. He is both a snuflbox dutcher and the overly permissive Unde, the 
1 
stingy landlord and the politicalliberal, thus indicating a detailed character and an 
apJreciation of the complexity ofhuman beings in general. However, we should 
, 
rerrlember it is the type that is primary and the combination ofthese recognizable 
1 
attributes oftype from which the individual, Brooke, evolves, thus allowing us to 
1 
understand and appreciate him. It is because we have affectionately laughed at other 
1 
men similar that we are able to like and sympathize with anyone so apparently 
i 
scattered. 
Eliot's understanding and manipulation ofshared behavior (i.e. type or typical 
behavior) consequent to that shared status, resonates and thus allows her to produce 
1 
recbgnizable characters. This resonance is an important portion ofthat which made 
1 
her fiction relevant du ring her own life as well as 150 years later. But beyond the 
1 
construction of recognizable characters, recognition as a mode of connection and 
1 
construction ofrelationships is so important to Eliot that she centers the novel's 
plo~line around it and, as weIl, the gaps left by a failure to complete - or even a tardy 
corrpletion of - that act of recognition. In considering this aspect of the novel 1 will 
1 
1 
begin as Eliot did, with Dorothea Brooke Casaubon. 
1 
ThroughoutMiddlemarch, and particularly in regard to Dorothea and Mr. 
1 
CaSaubon, strength of vision - the principal tool by which we recognize others -
plah an important part in indicating a character' s ability to recognize and respond to 
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those that surround them, and consequently to their ability to function. 22 Dorothea is 
1 
steadily described as being shortsighted and Casaubon, as losing his vision and thus 
1 
dependant on Dorothea to read to him, an ability that considering his own self 
1 
definition as a scholar is crucial. Both infirmities are indicative of a failure to 
recbgnize - each other certainly - but also themselves and, as weil, their respective 
, 
positions in the world. Dorothea strives to what would be considered a man's 
1 
pos,ition in her designing of cottages and Casaubon spends his life working on a text 
1 
that is (according to Will Ladislaw and probably Eliot herself considering the 
1 
importance she placed on German thought) irrelevant due to a refusaI to consider the 
prob-ess that German scholarship had made. However, there are difference in the 
, 
infirmities bestowed upon the two characters and it is important to note those 
di~erences. Although Dorothea is shortsighted, hers is a disability that can be 
corrected andalthough perhaps (according to the concepts of the day) her wishes are 
1 
inappropriate, those wishes are worthwhile and suggest open vistas and increased 
goJd for others, whereas Casaubon's loss of sight is permanent and his refusaI to 
1 
co~sider ideas that are not his own is indicative of a mind that is c10sed and c1osing. 
In that more irredeemable failure of Casaubon - his permanent loss of vision - is 
posited the hopelessness of his ever being able to understand or appreciate either 
1 
Dorothea or even bis own work. 
1 
, 
Edward Casaubon is constantly defined by his inability (his refusaI?) to see. 
Fol him Dorothea's affection and loyalty are invisible, hidden, as Eliot notes in 
22 lI:t sorne cases, such as Rosamond VincylLydgate who is constantly presented near or in reference to 
a reflective surface - Bernard Paris notes the significance of Eliot' s using the simile of scratches in a 
pier glass for Rosamond's habit ofthought (129) - the direction of vision is as important as the 
strength. 
1 , 
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chapter 42, behind that speck ofselfthat if "very close to our vision [will] blot out the 
1 
glory of the world, and leave only the margin by which we see the blot" 
1 
(Middlemarch 346). So, rather than seeing Dorothea and what she offers him (despite 
its ldmitted limitations), Casaubon sees merely her emerging doubt in himself as a 
1 
deli1neation of his own doubts about his ability to finish his "great" Key to Ali 
Mythologies. The speck that blots out his world is his potential failure and Dorothea, 
1 
with her doubts, is the negative space at the margins that outlines his own suspicions, 
1 
1 
briQging them into focus. Within a Hegelian template, if Casaubon is attempting to 
1 
"Màster" Dorothea, thus figuring his wife as "Slave," for him she does not possess an 
1 
1 
"independent self-consciousness" (Williams 73) and as such cannot offer him 
. 
"gehuinely independent recognition" (Williams 74). So, the doubt he sees in his wife 
is nierely that reflection ofhis own. 
1 
Whether Casaubon's text would be great is, of course, debatable, but even if 
we assign sorne value to his work, Eliot creates a scenario in which the importance of 
his kCholarship is questionable, as it is never suggested that Casaubon' s thoughts are 
1 
of Value. Rather, even he values only his mountains ofresearched material; thus we 
have his attempt to secure a promise from Dorothea to continue the work of 
1 
1 
orgànizing that material. It is a request to martyrdom that destroys our sympathy as 
1 
his ~ttempt to control Dorothea joins the constant lessening of his vision, his ideas 
1 
and· his generosity, and serves to remind us just how small he is. Even the sympathy 
1 
Eliot manages to evoke for this less than appealing man is created through lessening 
and lloss, specifically his loss of vision and his consequent desperation and fear. In 
1 
these tangible ways Eliot offers us indications of how this couple is groping about in 
1 
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the bist, but their problems with recognition do not begin and end with an inability to 
see !clearly or weil. In Dorothea' s shortsightedness is a representation of a different 
1 • 
con~eption of recognition. In order to consider these other concepts 1 would like to 
return to the Hegelian template 1 use above with Casaubon and consider how 
1 
Dorothea steps through Hegel' s three stages of recognition presented in his "Master 
1 
and' Slave" discourse as neatly as if she is stepping through the proscribed moves of a 
1 
·1 mlI~uet. 
Middlemarch is a novel that is informed by an Hegelian idea of recognition. 
It is a story in which - as with Hegel' s master/slave dialogue - "the concept of spirit" 
is "constituted through reciprocal recognition" (Williams 61), a world in which 
Do~othea is the "1 that becomes a We" (Williams 60). 1 would like to begin as 1 did 
in r~gard to Wonderland and Alice, with a step by step consideration of the 
relationships, beginning specifically with the Dorothea/Casaubon courtship and 
1 
marriage within the structure ofHegel's theory of recognition. With that in mind, it 
1 
seems reasonable to begin with the first stage in which that "confrontation with the 
1 
1 
other" catapults the subject out ofhis/her solipsism (Williams 64). Although it is 
1 
teDtpting to posit Hegel's "confrontation" in the couple's introduction, as that 
int~oduction is represented as something of an epiphany for Dorothea, 1 would argue 
1 
that both the actors in this particular drama are deep in a solipsistic reverie in which 
1 
their partner is merely an object and as such does not function as "other" until a 
1 
moment weil into their honeymoon in Rome. As Dorothea has married Casaubon to 
acdess knowledge and as a vehicle by which to create for herself a satisfactory 
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posItion in life23 (that of a necessary helpmeet to a great man who is doing great work 
- t~us we have Dorothea' s despairing reaction to Will' s revelatory comments about 
Ca~aubon's work being worthless) it is only when her husband's wish (need) to be 
1 
left,to work alone crosses her own wish (need) to be useful and thus invalidates her 
1 
intended future, that the confrontation with the "other" occurs. Until that time 
1 
1 
Casaubon has been an idea rather than an "other." 
For Casaubon too, Dorothea exists as an object or idea, she is to be the 
ad~ring and largely silent automaton he feels he needs to ease his burden, not fully 
aware that the greatest portion of bis burden is self doubt. The confrontation for 
1 
CaSaubon cornes in Rome as weil, culminating when it becomes clear that Dorothea 
has1doubts which reflect his own. Once again it is that "fateful" comment of Will 
La4islaw about the relevance ofCasaubon's work that acts as catalyst in the creation 
of a mutual recognition of limitations that allows the entrance of doubt, disallowing 
1 
the,negation that they have mutually upheld throughout their previous existence amid 
1 
pre-ethical and pre-recognition desires. However, each of the players within this 
1 
1 
matriage has a different reaction to this moment of recognition, and 1 will begin with 
Ca~aubon's reaction, for it is his refusai of recognition that constructs the remainder 
of ~he marriage. 
Casaubon never fully leaves his pre-ethical desire behind, never fully 
recognizes Dorothea. Although he is not allowed to remain in his solipsistic 
1 
"paradise" in which he refuses information as to the position his work will take in the 
23 Jt, is worth noting that bath Dorothea and Rosamond's fust marriages are enacted by the two women 
in ah attempt to create what each considers an appropriate situation. However they part company with 
their second marriages as it is suggested that Rosamond continues the trend, whereas Dorothea 
advances to a different (and in Eliot's estimate better) style of connection. 
1 
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, 
wo~ld ofscholarship (and here 1 conflate his work with his identity - as he does 
himself), he attempts in a second phase reaction (particularly after discovering his 
reduced life expectancy) to retain his pre-ethical desire and "consume" the "object" 
! 
necessary to obtaining that desire (Williams 63). That "object" is of course Dorothea 
1 
, 
to whom Casaubon makes the request that she "apply [her]selfto do what 1 should 
1 
desire" (Eliot, Middlemarch 394). Although this is not exactly the request that 
Do~othea assumes it to be, that of dedicating her life to his work - work that she no 
lon~er values - but includes as well an attempt to bar her from marriage to Will 
Ladislaw, both portions ofthis request are an attempt to negate Dorothea and fulfill 
1 
Casaubon' s pre-ethical desire to complete his work and deny Will that which 
1 
Ca~ubon views as his own property (i.e. Dorothea and his estate). Dorothea as a 
1 
subject does not figure in the request, rather she is elided and consumed in a process 
1 
in ~hich the "telos" ofCasaubon' s "satisfaction is the reinstatement of [his] 
solipsistic identity" (Williams 63), i.e. the reinstatement ofhis dream of scholarly 
1 
importance and the "master" relationship that his financial support of Will had 
allowed him to believe in. 
One of the tragedies of this sad, lonely and ungenerous man is that he is 
umlble to recognize that Dorothea, in offering her companionship, is tendering a great 
gift that might, despite its solipsistic roots, evolve into a real relationship. He is 
1 
un8;ble to recognize her as anything but that Hegelian reflection ofhis own doubts and 
1 
an ~nstrument through which he might revert to an existence in which he would be 
1 
1 
able to refuse those doubts (or at least ignore them). Dwight H. Purdy, in his essay 
, 
1 
"The One PoorWord in Middlemarch" in which he carefully counts the usage of the 
1 
68 
wOfd "poor" as a signification ofvarious states ofbeing of the characters described, 
nod~s that "[flor every 'Poor Dorothea'" there is a "Poor Casaubon" and that Eliot's 
1 . 
na.rrator: 
1 
.. .invests a great deal in the adjective's power to arouse sympathy. 
Whenever it appears, it cornes with a thick array of other rhetorical 
pleas for compassionate understanding. But, as we will see, the 
narrator does not get past the last "poor Casaubon," the context of the 
final references implying an ironic judgment. (811) 
Beyond the obvious irony, 1 would suggest that Eliot does pit y Casaubon, not 
1 
ho~ever because ofthose things he fails to achieve or receive, but rather for his 
1 
inability to see and recognize. Sympathy for Casaubon is conflated with pit y and as 
1 
such is both permanent and hopeless. Consequently, it is of a different variety than 
that bestowed on his wife. Pit y (rather than sympathy) for Dorothea is far more 
1 
transient and situational, for Dorothea' s difficulties are part of a pro cess and lead to 
1 
another state ofbeing. 
1 
1 
Dorothea too begins her marriage in a state of soli psi sm, viewing her husband 
1 
as trierely a vehicle to astate she desires. Eliot's opening discourse on Saint Theresa 
is ai roughed out portrait of Dorothea' s "soul" and desire for a greatness created 
thrQugh martyrdom, and Casaubon, with his ugly appearance and apparently cerebral 
1 
life embodied in a devotion to knowledge, provides what she believes to be a perfect 
1 
stake upon which to impale herself. But there are differences in the two forms of 
sol~psism represented within this couple. Despite Dorothea' s wish for martyrdom 
beibg less than entirely altruistic - it is after aIl grounded in a wish for a realization of 
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sorne form of greatness and only resorted to because Dorothea feels that, as she states 
over and over again, as a woman she can do nothing great - yet the very fact that this 
1 
wish contains an outward gaze (once again we are confronted with sight) and a wish 
1 
, 
to know and do outside ofher limitations and self, places Eliot's protagonist in a 
1 
1 
position more readily used as a launching pad to a more fully realized identity. As 
weil, once she has managed to recover from the confrontation with the "other" that 
1 
she;discovers in Mr. Casaubon, even within her second stage "opposition of 
pariiculars" (Williams 66) her "desire" is for a greater intimacy, once again an 
1 
outivard facing position that presupposes Hegel's construction in which "[s]elf-
con'sciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (Hegel 
sec! 175) and desire becomes "fundamentally a desire for the other" (Williams 64). 
Dorothea's desire, which although on sorne level produces her husband as an 
object, is posited in a desire for the "other" as is made clear at the beginning of 
1 
Chapter 28: "When would the days begin of that active wifely devotion which was to 
1 . 
strengthen her husband's life and exalt her own?" (Eliot, Middlemarch 227). This is 
not
l 
to say, however, that she has reached the third stage of recognition and the mutual 
ab~olution that implies full recognition, for although outward facing she still desires 
to 'fmaster" Casaubon, i.e. force him to play the role that fulfills her desire. It is her 
1 
realization that Casaubon is not going to be the object she has designed in her 
1 
sol~psistic fantasies that creates the anger that is indicative of the second stage of the 
1 
masterlslave dialectic: 
She was in the reaction of a rebellious anger stronger than any she had 
felt since her marriage. Instead of tears there came words: -
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'What have 1 done - what am 1 - that he should treat me so? He never 
knows what is in my mind - he never cares. What is the use of 
anything 1 do? He wishes he had never married me.' (Eliot, 
Middlemarch 352) 
Alt~ough this excerpt represents Dorothea as wishing for connection with her 
husband, a wish that implies a movement toward the third stage of recognition, at this 
1 
point in the text she is still enmeshed in the second stage for despite the lines above 
1 
1 
appearing to be (somewhat) altruistic, ail Casaubon has done to evoke them is to turn 
, 
aw~y from her, thus refusing to recognize Dorothea's own ideas of "herselfas 
necessary." It is not my intention, however, to let Casaubon off the hook, for as he 
realizes his own imminent death, he steps into the battle for mastery with a will, 
i 
atteinpting to enslave Dorothea in order that he (bis work and estate) may be allowed 
1 
a form of extended life. In fighting back Dorothea is defending her life in a material 
waf, as is made c1ear by her illness after her husband ' s death. Meanwhile, within the 
, 
batt,le waged during Casaubon's final weeks, he makes every attempt to take control 
over his wife's life, i.e. to become her master in the equation oftheir relationship. 
1 
1 
1 
That is not to say that Dorothea has stepped out ofthe battle, she too is still 
deep in the second stage in which she wishes to "conquer" her husband and remake 
1 
1 
him' into the man she needs, a man who will respond to her with openness, affection 
and lat least a modicum of camaraderie. It is only after she has spent the night 
wrestling with her emotions, so that she who began "with a movement towards 
1 
striking . .. ends with conquering h[ er] desire to strike" (Eliot, Middlemarch 353), is 
1 
1 
able to find her way into that third phase of recognition in which she accepts her 
husband limitations. In "conquering her desire to strike" she finds a necessary space 
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i 
between her own desires and her anger at his failure to meet those desires. She waits 
for basaubon to come upstairs with a calm that has "cost her a litany of pictured 
sorfows and ... silent cries" (Eliot, Middlemarch 353) but allows her to recognize 
1 
both Casaubon's sorrow as weIl as the gentleness ofhis reaction. It is only in that 
! 
space she has carved out between her own intense needs and violent reactions that she 
1 
1 
can' absolve her husband. Even so, Dorothea do es not yet reach the full fruition of the 
thiid stage as, for Hegel, that stage includes "mutual" absolution and absolution is not 
a r~alization that is granted Casaubon. Casaubon remains embedded in the second 
1 
stage of recognition right up until his death and Dorothea is left to make the 
remainder of the joumey with others. 
At this stage, a briefdiscussion ofHegel's theory in terms ofa few ofthose 
other characters within the text will move my argument forward, as recognition is 
1 
, 
infl~ential in a number of the different relationships within the plot. The most 
1 
ob~ious choice is the other important protagonist in the story, Lydgate. The marriage 
1 
ofLydgate and Rosamond is a union which is embedded in mis-recognition. Mis-
, 
recognition of each other - certainly - but as weIl, for Lydgate, mis-recognition of 
1 
hirri.selfand his own powers. Lydgate, as a man of science who believes himselfto 
haJe been made wise and fortified by his experience with the actress Laure and her 
, 
(in la way generous if chilling) confession to him about her opportunistic killing ofher 
1 
husband, believes he is proof against women. What he is not safe from, of course, is 
himself and his inability to recognize the side ofhis nature which is not scientific and 
1 
logical- that which, because ofthat inability, constitutes his limitations. Lydgate 
refi)Ises to recognize that he might be required to do anything he has decided he will 
1 
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i 
1 
not do: thus he gets involved with Bulstrode, and consequently local politics; thus he 
mahies Rosamond although he has swom not to marry anyone for a number of valid 
1 
reasons. 
1 
So we must recognize that if Lydgate's failure to achieve what he sets out to 
do occurs partially because Lydgate does not recognize Rosamond (and he does not-
he sets out with no conception of the power of her will) and the fact that she is the 
1 
wr6ng wife for a man in his position, he also fails because he does not recognize 
1 
hiniself and his limitations. This failure to recognize his own parameters models him 
1 
as a never fully realized consciousness and throws his conflating ofRosamond with 
1 
the basil plant, which "flourished wonderfully on a murdered man's brains" (Eliot, 
Middlemarch 686) into a different light. For although Lydgate is far more 
1 
sympathetic than Rosamond (who only once emerges from her pre-ethical desire to 
do ~s she pleases), her inability to recognize any other person including her husband 
is np more responsible for Lydgate's failure than his own failure to recognize: 
1 
Rosamond, his tendency to impulsive action and his position in the world. And that -
recognition of one' s position in the world - figures large in Middlemarch: for 
1 
Dorothea, whose many frustrations, whether we agree with Eliot's conception of the 
app~opriate limitations applied to women or not, come from an unwillingness to 
recognize and accept her position; for Lydgate in his refusai to accept that, as a 
1 
doctor, the world's opinion and money must affect him; and - in an entirely different 
vein for another couple whom 1 have yet to mention - Mary Garth and Fred Vincy. 
1 
ln discussing Mary and Fred, for whom recognition is the key ingredient to success, 1 
1 
will begin with this idea of the recognition of one's position in the world. 
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Mary Garth possesses a full recognition of her position in the world. This 
recognition is brought home to the reader in the very first scene in which we are 
introduced to Mary, and it is worth our while to consider this scene carefully, for, 
1 
except for Mr. Farebrother's regard, nearly every aspect ofMary's position - as weil 
as Mary's clear recognition ofthat position - is represented~ First and most 
ma~erially, we are presented in this scene with Mary performing a job that is less than 
1 • 
attr~ctive, but - to her - more appealing than that ofbeing a govemess. Sh~ caters to 
and, cares for her unpleasant uncle, Peter Featherstone, fully aware (i.e. recognizing) 
1 
! 
that, considering her family's financiaJ situation, sorne sort of job is necessary. AIso 
on a material plane, we are presented with Mary's very clear conception ofher 
ph~sical appearance, specifically with her statement: "What a brown patch 1 am by 
the :side ofyou, Rosy!" (Eliot, Middlemarch 93). AIthough certainly not without 
appeal to at least two gentlemen, Mary is under no illusions as to her claims to 
1 , 
1 
beallty. Finally, in this scene we are made fully aware of a fact that Mary recognizes 
1 
ma~ be of great importance to her - that Fred Vincy loves her. These details make up 
the Iparameters of Mary Garth's position in the world: in need of employment, less 
, 
thaA beautiful, and beloved by Fred. At first glance, it seems that Mary might jump at 
the pne positive factor in this equation, Fred' s love, but her recognition of her 
1 
position in the world includes a few more - less material - factors that include her 
1 
family' s great affection and respect for her and an ability to recognize and estimate 
1 
her :own worth. It is this recognition that not only keeps Mary safe (refusing Fred . 
1 
until Fred has proves himself able to step beyond the position of dilettante and leach), 
but ;as weil allows Fred to evolve into a "fine" man rather than a "gentle"man. That 
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insistence of Mary as to her value gives Fred the time it takes to develop a clear 
1 
conception of his own position in the world - something that he struggles with. 
Fred has been both told and educated to believe that he deserves to be a 
gentleman of leisure (or at least principally so in the role of a clergyman). Educated 
to Decorne a member of the clergy and allowed (through the association with wealthy 
1 
young gentlemen at school) to develop the tastes of a gentleman while assuming that 
1 
1 
the Itaste for the clergy will take care of itself, Fred has no understanding of where he 
1 
1 
bel<:>ngs in the world. Add to this the complication of a "possible" inheritance from 
1 
his Uncle Featherstone and Fred is truly in limbo. But limbo is not that productive 
1 
gap: that we have watched so many characters put to use in the consideration of a next 
1 
step. Rather it is a position from which a next step is impossible. The productive gap 
only materializes when (through something of a misstep byPeter Featherstone) Fred 
does not inherit and finds himself between a necessary career in the clergy which he 
1 
dis(jkes and Mary refuses to consider as possible for Fred as her husband, and the 
1 
1 
nee~ to discover sorne alternative. It is from this untenable24 position that Fred, with 
1 
1 
the ~hand of necessity placed firmly in the middle of his back, discovers his path in 
1 
1 
lifet 
Fred succeeds (after a few false starts) in building a life for himself But why 
does Fred succeed where others fail? What is it that sets Fred apart from Tertius 
Lydgate who seems to possess a more sophisticated intellect and yet does not succeed 
1 
in building a satisfactory life? l would argue that the difference lies in an ability to 
recbgnize, for if Fred does not at first entirely recognize his own position in the 
24 1 hse the word "untenable" with purpose and in direct opposition to the idea of being in limbo. 
Lirnbo is defined by lack of rnovernent, i.e. waiting for the action of sorne other, and untenabJe is 
defined by rnovernent made necessary by an inability to rnaintain within the status quo. 
1 
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world, he is able to recognize when a place and position is wrong, and, most 
1 
important, Fred recognizes Mary. Regardless of aIl other vicissitudes in his life and 
1 
his 'mother's dissenting voice, Fred never wavers from his appreciation of Mary and 
1 
his recognition ofher value both to himself and (with a hint from Mrs. Garth) others. 
1 
This recognition in conjunction with his pleasant temper mitigates Fred Vincy' s many 
1 
failings and allows the scales to balance in his favor. Mary even makes the statement 
, 
1 
that her reason for loving him is posited in this appreciation, saying to Mr. 
Far~brother "1 should never be quite happy ifI thought he was unhappy for the loss of 
me.: It has taken such deep root in me - my gratitude to him for always loving me 
best, and minding so much ifI hurt myself' (Eliot, Middlemarch 427). 
1 
1 
1 
1 
By the end of the novel, it is Fred and Mary who are represented as most 
suc~essful. Not only are they "happy" as aIl "good" couples should be, but success is 
coriIpletely shared. Eliot makes this a point with her description ofhow when each 
wri~es a book (arguably the ultimate achievement for Eliot) the other is given the 
! 
credit. This blurring of the lines of achievement, although also an ironie chuckle at 
1 
1 
the'townspeople's inability to grant other's their success, is also important in 
1 
ind~cating Fred and Mary's ultimate accomplishment as a couple in sync. It is an 
accprd that the Lydgates never even approach and Dorothea and Will never quite 
achieve. Despite Dorothea's happiness in the marriage there is a suggestion of 
, 
incpmplete fulfillment posited in a failure to reach that original wish for greatness. 
1 
Thi's failure to present Dorothea's second marri age as a complete success could be 
1 
coJsidered as indicative of the refusai central to Eliot's own life that 1 mentioned 
i 
earFer in this chapter, for, regardless of the motivation behind it - practical or 
, 
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otherwise, the adoption ofher common-Iaw "husband's" name is an irrefutable 
attJntion to at least a wish and possibly a need (consider her family background and 
heritraditional attitudes toward gender roles) to be recognized as a member of a 
socially sanctioned marri age. It seems likely that Eliot's ambivalence about women 
1 
and the untenable relationship that sometimes existed between the roles open to them 
1 
and a need for more scope is posited in Dorothea's yearning for greatness, for another 
1 
irrefutable fact lies in Eliot's statement that Dorothea felt "there was always 
soJething better which she might have done" (Middlemarch 686). 
It is with this yearning in mind that 1 would like to return to Dorothea to 
conclude my discussion, still incorporating both Hegel and Butler but from a slightly 
1 
different angle. In the introduction to Butler' s first major work of criticism, Subjects 
of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth Century France, there is a remarkable 
des~ription of attitudes and behavior that would serve as a description of Dorothea 
1 
Br60ke: 
The ideal of an internai integration of reason and desire not only poses 
an alternative to a naturalistic or positivistic understanding of desire, 
but promises to expand the very notion of rationality beyond its 
tradition al confines. If desires are essentially philosophical, then we 
reason in our most spontaneous ofyearnings. (Butler, Subjects 2) 
This is a methodology that Dorothea Brooke learns to implement within the text of 
Middlemarch. Throughout the novel she is represented as a woman who yearns (Eliot 
us~s the word to describe Dorothea in a number of cases including everything from a 
1 
i 
yearning for knowledge to a yearning for Will Ladislaw). To begin, in her youth and 
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idealism, she believes that she yeams only in regard to her intellectual self and the 
dutt through which it is realized, as is made clear through her self-righteous dismissal 
of the material posited in the rejection ofher mother's jewels, her inheritance, and 
Lo~ick. However, as we saw when applying the Hegelian Master and Slave template 
to the Casaubon marriage, Dorothea' s motivations and desires are not selfless, rather 
1 
they service her own needs - for intimacy and inclusion. As the novel evolves, 
holever, so does Dorothea. What allows Dorothea to gain success both as a 
1 
character in the novel and of the novel is her ability to recognize another portion of 
1 
herselfthrough her recognition of Casaubon and both Will and her des ire for Will . 
, 
Rosemary Ashton makes the comment that "Dorothea, beginning with her disillusion 
1 
witp Casaubon and Rome and the planting of the seed of affection and understanding 
between her and Will moves towards a 'clearness' of perception about her relation to 
1 
others in society" (157). In other words within her recognition ofher husband, her 
belbved and her desire, is posited the seeds ofher success. Through the recognition 
1 
i 
and integration of her des ire - i.e. her self or consciousness - she is able to finally 
construct a complete life. Eliot assembles this scenario carefully by making Will a 
choice of husband which not only the dead Casaubon refuses, but also a marri age 
, 
1 
dis~pproved by aU her connections. So, in choosing Will, who is a personification of 
1 • 
the;gap between her present and future, Dorothea cannot pretend to be followmg 
anYthing except her desire. Her final choice becomes not just a choice of husband but 
1 
a choice which consciously incorporates desire as a guide. 
1 
1 
1 
1 This, however, is merely the last step in the incorporation of the two, Dorothea 
1 
1 
ha~ been using desire as a guide aIl along. In this choice she is at first humored and 
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dismissed as innocent and slightly foolish as: Mr. Brooke ignores her ideas about 
cottages; Lydgate, her ideas about charity; and everyone, her choices of husbands. 
1 
1 
1 
And at the beginning those choices are often incorrect or misguided; it is 
1 
con'sciousness of her desire and the blending of that desire and her intellect that 
! 
fin~lly allow Dorothea agency and respect. Only after she has tread the path of 
recognition which culminates in her recognition ofWill's love and a interweaving of 
her Intelleetual and emotional selves does Dorothea begin to make consistently 
codeet choices (at least in regard to her own happiness). 
1 
1 Dorothea's desire may never have been an entirely pre-ethical desire such as 
Rosamond's, but as she learns to recognize others her desire evolves into that moral 
and philosophical desire ofwhich Butler speaks, the desire that acts as a motivating 
guige for the complete souI. It is through this "integration of reason and desire" that 
1 
Eliot models Dorothea as the most admirable ofbeings who "expand[s] the very 
1 • 
notion ofrationality" to include compassion and recognition. However misguided 
1 
1 
Dorothea appears to be at the outset of the novel, there is always a vague awareness 
of the "other" and a grain of goodness, generosity and aspiration in Dorothea' s 
1 
cho:ices. It is, after all, Dorothea that "knows" Lydgate is innocent of any wrong 
doi~g in the BulstrodelRafl1es affair. It is indicative ofEliot's own atheistic 
1 
mo~alism which Ashton caBs a "gain in clarity" (157), ofFeuerbach's statement that 
J 
"[~]hat man calls Absolute Being, his God, is his own being" (102) and of the 
1 
1 
parallel thrust of the moral and the rational that powered so many of the thinkers of 
Victorian England. Using the productive gap between: husbands, anger and 
acc~ptance, knowledge and desire, Dorothea manages to evolve past her shortsighted 
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1 
inability to recognize to a clear-sighted knowledge and an understanding of just "what 
evebthing costs" (Eliot, Middlemarch 667). 
Conclusion 
It is with that final promise to "Iearn what everything costs" that 1 would like 
to t}nish this thesis. For in so many ways that was the lesson that many Victorian 
1 
thinkers were trying to incorporate ioto their politics, their foreign policy, their 
1 
relationships between men and women; so many oftheir constructions were attempts 
to discover and redistribute the costs of the various policies utilized to govern the 
1 
lives lived under English sway. It is the costs - to relationships, community and 
individuals - that J. S. Mill was assessing and attempting to redistribute in his 
disçussion of the rights ofwomen in his essay "The Subjection ofWomen." Amy 
1 . 
Levy' s "Magdalen" bears Wltness to the cost extracted from any woman not shrewd 
1 
en~ugh to negotiate her contract with the man she loves before rather than after 
"farors" have been granted. A1though the costs are different, it is the same attempt to 
at least bring those cost to the attention of the world that Elizabeth Barrett Browning 
1 
1 
is involved with in poems like "The Cry of the Children" and "A Runaway Slave at 
1 
Pilgrim' s Point." 
1 find it fascinating that, a1though Carlyle was neither an abolitionist nor a 
proponent ofwomen's rights (rather, he held views quite contrary to both ideas) and 
didinot approve ofmany of the other changes that occurred in his lifetime (thus we 
haie his notable bitterness toward the end ofhis life), in an odd way we can consider 
sorne ofthese texts as springing from his cali to duty. With his push away from 
1 
do~ma and his need to approach the margins in order to offer his Jess than orthodox 
, 
1 
opi'nion, Carlyle opened a space that he probably never intended for the use it was put 
to. ! ln the space that existed between the necessary breaking of norms in order to 
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reach for new and revelatory concepts and his failure to dictate the manner in which 
1 
those new ideas would manifest themselves we find the fertile ground in which 
V· i . ·d . b 1 lctonan 1 entIty egan to evo ve. 
In Carroll' s case, the goals seem not to have been so universal. Rather, if we 
areito believe Leach, what appears to have a steady push against the margins of social 
stntctures - and perhaps even reality ifwe consider his subject matter - were 
employed in an attempt to build a position from which he could live the life he found 
rewarding with the woman he had chosen. However, regardless of whether we agree 
1 
with Leach or not, those spaces both separating and linking different ideas, milieus, 
and social conventions clearly intrigued him and he spent years investigating what it 
is t~t lies between what is acceptable and what is actually accepted, and that which is 
des,ired versus that which is understood. For many ifnot most of the characters that 
1 
1 
inhflbit Wonderland the cost of their pre-ethical desires is a inability to engage or 
1 
ev~n see the "other." The cost to Alice in her demand for a logical world in"which 
1 
ratibnal policy holds sway and is recognized as the methodology by which we ail best 
negotiate our understanding of each other and the world surrounding us is the loss of 
1 
1 
Wqnderland, for in the final court scene lies a clear message that to refuse inanity is 
1 
to ~efuse Wonderland itself Ali ofwhich leaves me to wonder what was it that 
1 
1 
de~ned the space that Carrollieft behind and what were the costs of that leave-
taking? Perhaps Leach is correct in her suggestion that Carroll was mouming a 
1 
, 
forbidden love that could only exist outside societal attention, or perhaps his leave-
1 
taIqng, like Eliot' s, was posited in his loss offaith and inability to fully take clerical 
1 
orders. 
1 
1 
1 
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1 
The costs involved in Eliot' s spiritual leave-taking are weil documented in 
1 
both her personalletters and her fiction, her disagreement with her beloved father 
ovJr the church and her need ofa penname, at least partially prompted by her choice 
oflifestyle, are just two ofthose payments. Certainly, just the sheer volume ofwork 
enüüled in the several translations of German thinkers such as Strauss and Feuerbach 
i 
that Eliot completed imply an understanding of dedication and investments of effort, 
1 
1 
as ~ell as a need to surmount difficulty. So, having read Middlemarch many years 
before studying the text, when 1 entered my tirst cJass in Victorian literature, 1 was 
surPrised to hear the prof essor and many of the students describe Eliot's text as a 
noJel about loss and resignation. For it is also, certainly, a story of enlightenment - a 
tale of recognition: of one person of another; of the costs that are inherent in every 
choice we make; and of the methodology by which each ofus best makes our way 
1 
through the world. When Dorothea makes the statement that she will leam "what 
1 
evetything costs," although it is embedded in a conversation of finances and is 
ostinsibly about the "cost" of''things,'' we are to understand that she is also referring 
to the cost of a poor choice of life partner and, as weil, the costs of privileging a 
dream over the need to recognize what is before one's eyes. 
1 
Recognition was the foundation that underlay many of the changes attempted 
1 
by the Victorians - recognition of cost to a community versus a refusai to recognize 
that which other's are paying for your gain. Political reform, women's rights, 
, 
abdlition were ail forms of the recognition of the costs paid by those not holding the 
, 
reiris of power, and despite the many failures of equity within the colonial world of 
1 
1 
Victorian England, 1 find the movement forward toward a more equitable society to 
1 
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have taken place at a breathtaking speed. If Carlyle was displeased by his failure to 
1 
perfomatively create the Englishman ofwhom he would approve, his words did open 
dolrs and motivate many to strive for a revised form of spirituality and/or - perhaps -
a nlw and greater humanity. Ifwe now no longer view humanity with that 
1 
enlightenment based conception ofutopian improvement, the least that the changes 
witpin Victorian England offered was both a foundation for the way in which we 
view the world today and a spectacular pageant of just how much can be achieved. 
1 
1 
1 
1 would like to finish this work with one final image - that of a constellation of 
ideas. Imagine if you will, each thinker' s work as an image on a transparency and 
1 
each ofthose transparencies piled one atop the other until any projection of the result 
, 
woùld appear as a constellation in which ail the points of intersection might indicate 
the shape of the Victorian persona with its attendant concems and hopes ail laid out 
1 
1 
before us. Admittedly there would be gaps or spaces between each point of 
1 
1 
intersection, after ail a constellation is composed of points, yet still we are given a 
1 
sen~e of form and, as weil, within those gaps between those junctures lay potential, 
wit~ the faint lines of each single image suggesting the shading which might further 
defi'ne our conception of just who the Victorians were. In the case of Victorian 
, 
lite~ature, created at a moment poised between the old world and the new, within 
1 
those points and gaps lay past, present and future, and, as weil, the sense of the host 
1 
1 
ofbeings behind the ideas offered in the words that compose the texts we still read 
1 
1 
today. 
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